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3Abstract
During the past decade, the telecommunication environment has evolved from
single operator featuring voice services to multi-operator featuring a range of dif-
ferent types of services. Services are being provided today in a distributed manner
in a connectionless environment requiring cooperation of several components and
actors. This report focuses on the incremental means to ensure access to services
for authorized users only by composing authentication and authorization patterns
and services. We propose a novel framework of authentication and authorization
patterns for securing access to services for authorized users only, and we demon-
strate how the patterns can be dynamically composed with services using a policy-
driven approach.
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1 Introduction
The evolution of service development in the telecommunications sector, driven by the
success of the Internet, creates a demand for dynamic service development in order to
continuously develop new services in a competitive market. There is a need for fast
incremental development of services and applications, while maintaining availability
properties.
We define a service as an identified partial functionality, provided by a system,
component, or facility, to achieve desired end results (goals) for end users or other
entities. The general notion of a service involves several service parts collaborating
to provide the service to one or more service users. Authentication and Authorization
functionality needed to ensure availability is no exception and falls within this general
definition of a service.
One of the core challenges of service engineering is to find practical ways to model
services (partial functionalities) separately such that services may be composed into
well functioning application systems satisfying availability requirements. This is espe-
cially challenging for services being provided in a distributed manner in a connection-
less environment requiring cooperation of several components and actors (users).
If services were independent of each other, service composition would be quite
straightforward. But services often depend on each other. Services also often depend
on shared resources and service enablers. They may be provided to many interacting
users, and users have access to many services over the same terminals using shared re-
sources and service enablers. This leads to the so-called crosscutting nature of services
as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The figure suggests an architecture for service-oriented systems, which is charac-
terized by horizontal and vertical composition. On the horizontal axis, system compon-
ents, are identified that are largely service independent and represent domain entities
such as users, terminals, service enablers and shared facilities. They may reside in
different computing environments. These domain entities such as users, user com-
munities, terminals and resources are represented by agents in the system. We use the
term agent in a general sense here to mean an entity representing and acting on be-
half of other entities. On the vertical axis, several services and service components
are identified (i.e. collaborations and collaboration roles) that depend on the system
components of the architecture.
         Horizontal
       composition
(within a service)
Vertical composition
(within an agent)
Service 1
Service 3
Service 2
Terminal
Agent x
User
Agent y
Group
Agent z
User
Agent w
Terminal
Agent k
service
part
Figure 1: Service Oriented Architecture
Service composition, in general, involves static composition at design time as well
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as dynamic linking and binding at runtime.
The new UML 2.0 collaboration concept [32] provides a structured way to define
partial functionalities in terms of collaborating roles, and therefore it provides a prom-
ising basis for service modeling. It allows service parts to be modeled as collabora-
tion roles, and service behavior to be specified using interactions, activity diagrams
and state machines as explained in [43]. Moreover, it provides means to decom-
pose/compose services using collaboration uses and to bind roles to classifiers defining
system components. In this way, UML 2.0 collaborations directly support service mod-
eling and service composition at design time. In addition, they provide a framework to
define so-called semantic interfaces as explained in [46] that can be utilized to ensure
compatibility among interacting components both at design time and runtime.
As Fig. 1 shows, service components interact with each other (”horizontally”) for
the actual execution of services. Services depend on each other (characterizing vertical
composition) e.g., authentication and authorization behavior first, before a service can
be invoked and services depend on shared resources and enablers (characterizing ho-
rizontal composition). The structure and linking of service components is to a large
extent dynamic. Therefore, dynamic linking is a fundamental and general mechanism
required in service-oriented systems. Important mechanisms for service discovery, fea-
ture selection, compatibility validation, and access control can be associated with the
creation and release of dynamic links. This linking may be seen as a process of dynam-
ically binding roles to actors, taking the agent states and preferences into account.
In [37], we have presented a conceptual model for service availability. Based on the
conceptual model for service availability presented in [37], this report focuses on the
incremental means to ensure access to services for authorized users only by compos-
ing authentication and authorization patterns and services. In order to address service
availability, we see availability as a composite notion consisting of exclusivity, the abil-
ity to ensure access for authorized users only, and accessibility, the property of being
on hand and useable when needed. Our approach involves the development of flexible
and re-usable patterns to ensure availability in service composition.
In this report we motivate and introduce a set of authentication and authorization
(AA-) patterns, which may be composed with services to ensure that services are ac-
cessible to the authorized users only. We provide a discussion of the specification of
AA-patterns and the means to compose AA-patterns with services both statically and
dynamically to restrict access to services to authorized users only. We explain in detail
the policy driven approach to specifying composition of AA-patterns and services1 .
In summary, our contributions include: (1) a framework and classification of au-
thentication and authorization patterns; (2) demonstrating that our framework can be
applied to static and dynamic composition; and (3) showing that our framework can
be used to specify and enforce policies governing composition of AA-patterns and ser-
vices.
The rest of this report is organized as follows: In Sect. 2 we state the requirements
to the approach. In Sect. 3 we present our classification of authentication and author-
ization patterns. In Sect. 4 we discuss our approach to specifying AA-patterns, and in
Sect. 5 we discuss how we apply policies. Use of AA-patterns in static composition of
services is addressed in Sect. 6, and use of AA-patterns in dynamic composition of ser-
vices is addressed in Sect. 7. A discussion of related work is given in Sect. 8 followed
by a summary and conclusion in Sect. 9.
1We have published two articles based on this report [40,41]. However, since publication of these articles,
some of the definitions regarding semantic interfaces have been refined [45]. This report has been updated
to be consistent with the terminolgy presented in [45].
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In order to explain the policy-driven approach, we formulate and motivate a set of
requirements that the approach is designed to fulfill.
1. The approach should facilitate specification of authentication and authorization
patterns in a flexible and reusable manner. It should be possible to be able to
model services independently and AA-patterns separately and then put them to-
gether and adapt them. As there are many different types of services, each with
different authentication and authorization requirements, there is a need for a fine-
grained approach that allows authentication and authorization design to be adap-
ted to service requirements. The approach must allow for tailoring modifications
with respect to e.g., strength of authentication provided and should be able to ad-
dress the pitfalls that designers face in selecting and implementing authentication
patterns to avoid faulty and weak implementations.
2. The approach should be easy for a designer to understand and use. Security
requirements, such as availability requirements, are often not taken into account
by developers in the design process for many reasons such as time to market and
costs constraints, and lack of knowledge about security amongst designers and
developers, as well as the complexity of the environment in which systems are
deployed [3]. The approach should be understandable to the developer/designer
and increase the designer’s awareness of security issues while enabling the de-
signer to address the issues systematically through choice and specialization of
e.g. an authentication pattern.
3. The approach should provide policy mechanisms that can be used for governing
the binding of roles to agents in dynamic service composition. This involves
providing a means to specify constraints on the binding of roles to agents to
ensure that service availability requirements can be achieved in a deployment.
In order to ensure that service roles that are dynamically linked within a service
execution are correctly linked, and to restrict which agents service roles can be
bound to, there is a need for a means to defining rules to govern the binding of
roles to agents.
4. The approach should provide a means for specifying the static composition of
AA-patterns and services. Static composition involves the assignment and com-
position of roles to form system components at design time. This involves build-
ing composite services using existing services and AA-patterns (choreography),
but also defining roles and system parts so that they can collaborate with each
other (orchestration). The approach should provide a descriptive means to spe-
cify rules regarding ordering of collaborations in composition. In particular,
requirements for which goals or states must have been achieved by collaborative
parts before any other behavior is allowed to execute. The framework should
also provide a means for modelling the dynamical restriction of the behavior in-
volved in service composition, e.g. exceptions handling (such as in the case that
authorizations are no longer valid, then the session should be forced to termin-
ate).
5. The approach should provide a means for supporting the dynamic composition
of AA-patterns and services. By dynamic composition, we mean both dynamic
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role-binding (i.e., creation and release of dynamic links) and dynamic composi-
tion of service role behaviors.
3 Framework for AA-patterns
Our framework consists of a classification of authentication and behavioration tech-
niques as patterns specified using UML 2.0 collaborations, with interactions and state
machines. We also specify the AA-patterns using semantic interfaces [45], to facilitate
validation of visible interface behavior for each of the roles involved in a collaboration
and to enable dynamic composition of AA-patterns and services.
We specify behavior using semantic interfaces because semantic interfaces facilit-
ate checking the compatibility (in terms of safety and liveness properties) of different
components involved in service collaboration (Interface behaviors are derived from the
complete component behaviors by projection). We declare role-binding policies in the
semantic interface for each of the roles involved, as we find this useful for validating
that the required conditions and requirements have been fulfilled when composing the
pattern with services. In the following sections we present our classification of AA-
patterns.
3.1 Authentication patterns
Authentication theory and practice has evolved over time and is well established in the
literature [4,28,30] as well as in the standards [18–20,22,23]. The simplest authentica-
tion patterns involve two parties. Variations involve proxies, or trusted third parties. By
a third party we mean a component, service or organization, which both other parties
are willing to rely on. In some cases, each party relies on a different trusted third
party, who in turn trust each other through a trusted third party. We begin therefore, by
addressing patterns involving two parties, as these can be generalized or extended to
involve trusted third parties.
A generic two party authentication pattern involves communication between the
two parties to establish the identity of one of the parties in the case of unilateral au-
thentication, or both in the case of mutual authentication. Messages are generated and
exchanged between the parties, at least one message/pass is required for unilateral au-
thentication, and at least two messages/passes are required for mutual authentication.
In order to apply authentication protocols and techniques [4, 28, 30] in a model-
based approach, we have classified these well known authentication techniques and
protocols as authentication patterns specified using UML 2.0 collaborations, which
may be combined with service components in service composition. Each pattern is
modelled in UML 2.0 so that it may be re-used, but also may be easily adapted and
adjusted depending on requirements such as security and performance requirements,
for example regarding the the strength of the crypto involved related to the capacity
available in the actual deployment.
For modelling authentication of one actor playing one role in a service collaboration
to an actor playing another role in a service collaboration we need a fine grained classi-
fication of authentication patterns. this is because the behavior required and strength of
authentication required depends on the service to be deployed. In one case, unilateral
one-pass authentication might be sufficient, e.g. for access to an online telephone cata-
logue, however, in another case, mutual two pass authentication may be required, as
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is the case for authenticating terminals and access points to each other in third genera-
tion mobile networks. Additionally, in the first example, a simple message containing
a username and password satisfies the service requirements, whereas in the second
example, hardware protected keys for use in a symmetric-based crypto protocol are re-
quired. The behavior required, the type of keying to be used, and the strength of crypto
to be used is service dependent.
UniOnePass
Authenticate
Unilateral
Authenticate
TwoParty
Authenticate
Mutual
Authenticate
UniTwoPass
Authenticate
MTwoPass
Authenticate
MThreePass
Authenticate
Figure 2: Authentication patterns
Our classification is therefore motivated by the need to address behavioral consid-
erations in the patterns. This means classification based first on the service provided,
unilateral authentication or mutual authentication, then based on the number of mes-
sages involved in the pattern, e.g., one message for a one pass authentication protocol,
two messages for a two pass authentication protocol. Fig. 2 shows this generic classi-
fication of two party authentication patterns. For the full classification see Appendix C.
The aim is to make the developer more conscious in the choice of authentication
technique to apply, while allowing flexibility with respect to the choice of protocol and
algorithm(s) and other crypto techniques to be used. This allows the developer to focus
on e.g. whether there is an issue such as timing regarding the number of messages
involved e.g. one-pass, two-pass or three pass, or should symmetric or asymmetric
keying be used, before choosing the protocol and algorithm in the instantiation of the
pattern.
Fig. 2 shows these generic patterns that do not bind a particular protocol or al-
gorithm. Once a generic pattern is selected, the authentication pattern can be further
differentiated in specializing the pattern depending on the type of keying, e.g., sym-
metric or asymmetric, to be used.
For example, the unilateral one pass authentication pattern may be specialized as
illustrated in the UML 2.0 class diagram shown in Fig. 3. There is a class for all
unilateral one pass patterns employing symmetric crypto techniques, that is for which
the authenticating party and the party requesting authentication share a common secret
key which is used in the crypto protocol. Similarly, there is a class for all unilateral one
pass patterns employing asymmetric crypto techniques, and a class for all patterns for
which the unilateral one pass authentication algorithm employs a Hash function.
The patterns are then further specialized with respect to the authentication tech-
nique, or cryptographic protocol and algorithm(s) to be applied, e.g., for the unilateral
two-pass authentication pattern, the HTTP digest authentication protocol with the MD5
hash algorithm may be applied [14]. By doing this, we separate out the choices that
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UniOnePass 
Authenticate
UniOnePass 
Authenticate
Symmetric
UniOnePass 
Authenticate
Asymmetric
UniOnePass 
Authenticate Crypto 
Check Function 
(keyed hash)
UniOnePass 
Authenticate
Hash Function 
(unkeyed hash)
Figure 3: Unilateral one pass authentication patterns
must be made by the developer, and pinpoint each of the levels of specialization for
awareness. This is because it is not enough to choose a general model and apply just
any technique or protocol and assume that required level of security is achieved. By
security level we mean the strength of authentication required to provide the required
protection against misuse. There are altogether too many examples illustrating that
depending on choices at each of these layers, the actual implementation can be flawed.
One example of this is the Microsoft challenge/reply handshake protocol, used in
Microsoft’s Point-to-Point Tunnelling Protocol (PPTP). In this example, a design flaw
in the protocol and a choice of a weak password hashing algorithm both contributed to
the reported weakness of the authentication implementation [47]. Additionally, there
were other flaws in the implementation itself. It is because flaws may be introduced
at different stages in authentication design and implementation that we have chosen
to classify patterns separating stages of specialization. These stages are as follows:
First, a general pattern is chosen from the classification in Fig. 2. Then, the pattern is
specialized according to technique, e.g., if crypto is to be employed, then a choice must
be made between symmetric or asymmetric keying, and then a protocol must be chosen
along with algorithms or functions required by the protocol. If desired, an original
protocol and algorithm may be designed for the application and specified during the
design process. This will allow the developer to analyze authentication at each stage
of specialization of the models, so that flaws and weaknesses may be discovered and
corrected. For a more detailed discussion regarding choice of authentication pattern
see Appendix C.1.1.
It is important to distinguish between weak versus strong authentication, and weak-
nesses and errors that arise simply due to implementation errors. The strength of the
authentication pattern can be tuned with respect to the combination of the protocol,
the algorithm and the key-length. However, errors in implementation can significantly
weaken the authentication mechanism delivered. Assurance techniques such as e.g.
use of the Common Criteria [21] may help in the latter.
3.2 Authorization patterns
In order to describe any authorization pattern, it is important to recognize that any
authorization pattern requires that authentication has been performed before any au-
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thorizations may be granted. Authentication and authorization patterns are combined
to describe how access rights are granted and are thus essential to access control. Ad-
ditionally, an access control model is required for access rights administration.
There are two basic authentication and authorization architectures [12]:
User Pull: Authentication is performed by an access server, which also issues au-
thorizations to the user. The user then presents authorizations directly to the service.
Server Pull: The service centralizes information about user entity authorizations
on an access server. The service authenticates the user. When the user attempts to
access the service, the service queries the access server to determine whether the user
is authorized.
These architectures provide a means for handling authorizations in a centralized
manner. For the full classification of these architectures as patterns, see Appendix D.
4 Specification of AA-patterns
4.1 Specification of two-party authentication patterns
4.1.1 Using UML 2.0 collaborations
A UML 2.0 collaboration diagram for the generic two party authentication pattern is
given in Figure 4. The collaboration diagram shows that the authenticatee role
cooperates with the authenticator role.
 
TwoPartyAuthenticate
authenticatee authenticator
Figure 4: Collaboration diagram for the two party authentication pattern
A specialization of this pattern for unilateral two pass authentication is shown in
Fig. 5. Using this specialization, an agent is able to authenticate another agent using a
challenge response sequence in two passes. This view shows the goal for the collabor-
ation, expressed in OCL.
{def: goal : Boolean = authenticatee.Unilaterally_Authenticated}
 
UniTwoPassAuthenticate
authenticatee : 
responder
authenticator : 
challenger
Figure 5: Unilateral two pass authentication
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A detailed view of a specialization of this pattern for unilateral two pass authen-
tication is shown in Fig. 6. This view expresses more completely the properties that
the system components (such as agents) must have in order to successfully particip-
ate in the pattern. Any instance playing the authenticatee role must possess the
properties specified by responder and any instance playing the authenticator
role must possess the properties specified by challenger. The instance playing the
authenticatee role must possess a secret, and the instance playing the authenti-
cator role must possess knowledge that is mathematically related to the secret. The
instance playing the authenticator role must be able to generate a challenge,
which is sent to the instance playing the authenticatee role, and validate the
response. Similarly, the instance playing the authenticatee role must be able
to generate a response to the challenge. The constraints (on the properties
that the instances playing the roles must possess) are declared as invariants and pre-
conditions using the object constraint language (OCL).
 
UniTwoPass Authenticate
responder
secret : string
GenerateResponse ()
challenger
challenge : string         
knowledge : string
GenerateChallenge ()
ValidateResponse ()
authenticatorauthenticatee
{ Context  c:UniTwoPassAuthenticate 
Inv: 
c.authenticatee.Generate Response.is_generatable AND 
c.authenticator.GenerateChallenge.is_generatable AND 
c.authenticator.ValidateResponse.is_validatable
Pre: 
c.authenticatee.secret.is_assigned AND 
c.authenticator.knowledge.is_assigned AND
Relation (c.authenticatee.secret, c.authenticator.knowledge) }
Figure 6: UML 2.0 Collaboration diagram for unilateral two-pass authentication, de-
tailed view
Three invariants are declared: The first and third invariants are used to check that
the instance playing the authenticator role is deployed on a part of the system
(terminal/node) with the required processing and computing capacity required to gen-
erate the challenge and to validate the response. Similarly, the second invariant is used
to check that the instance playing the authenticatee role is deployed on a part
of the system (terminal/node) with the required processing and computing capacity re-
quired to generate the response. The reason for declaring these invariants is to ensure
that the protocol and algorithm chosen are not too processor intensive for the parts on
which they are deployed so that the authentication protocol can run whenever the col-
laboration is instantiated. The motivation for this is to ensure that service requirements
regarding accessibility [37] are fulfilled when this authentication pattern is composed
with service components/parts.
The two pre-conditions check that secret and knowledge, respectively, are
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assigned before the collaboration can instantiate. The third pre-condition checks that
there is a mathematical relationship between secret and knowledge. This means
that a check can be performed to ensure that there is a pre-existing mathematical rela-
tionship between secret and knowledge as required by the authentication pattern
to be deployed. The OCL pre-conditions can be used to perform a boolean check to
confirm that the a priori conditions for the authentication protocol are fulfilled. This
formalization of the mathematical relationship between secret and knowledge has
been chosen in order to be general enough to allow for alternative crypto protocols to
be specified at later stages in development. Note that if symmetric keying is used, then
secret = knowledge.
4.1.2 Using semantic interfaces
{def: goal : Boolean = authenticatee.Unilaterally_Authenticated  }
 
U n iT wo PassA u th en ticate  
authenticatee : 
responder
authenticator :  
challenger
UniTwoPassAuthenticate  : responder UniTwoPassAuthenticate  :challenger
idle
idle
Unilaterally_Authenticated
{ goal  =  true }
Generate 
Response
Generate  
Challenge
Validate
Response
waiting
waiting
NotAuthenticated
idle
P1 P2
Challenge
Challenge
Response
Response
Ok NOk
Unilaterally_Authenticated NotAuthenticated
idle
Ok NOk
[Response  
   Valid] [Response  NOTValid]
Figure 7: UML 2.0 collaboration and semantic interfaces for the unilateral two pass
authentication pattern
A semantic connector is defined as an elementary collaboration with consistently
defined pair of semantic interfaces and service goals [45]. The semantic interfaces may
be modelled using two state transition diagrams defining the interface behavior for each
of the roles involved in the collaboration and possible expressions stating the goals
of the collaboration. In [46] it is described how semantic interfaces can be defined
based on role modeling and simple goal expressions. The focus is on checking the
compatibility of different service components involved in the provisioning of a service.
Definition of semantic interfaces allows us to validate the interface behavior rather than
validating the complete component behavior. Semantic interfaces facilitate validation
of both safety and liveness properties. It is pointed out in [46] that UML 2.0 protocol
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statemachines are not sufficient, and the authors propose a specification of a form of
UML 2.0 state machines for two way interface behavior as shown in Fig. 7.
In this figure, the UML 2.0 collaboration for unilateral two-pass authentication
pattern is shown with two role state machines that define the visible behavior of the
two roles participating in the pattern.
In addition to syntactical interfaces, semantic interfaces define the visible interface
behavior and goals of the collaboration. In this case, the semantic interface defines the
interface behavior and goals of the authenticatee and authenticator roles.
Semantic interfaces in particular are projections of behavior on an interface and are
characterized by:
• one action per transition
• spontaneous output
• visibility of variables and goals
4.2 Specification of n-party authentication and authorization pat-
terns
We model the User Pull authentication and authorization services as a UML 2.0 col-
laboration that defines three collaborating participants that interact to implement the
user pull authentication and authorization behavior: these are the User, Access
Server, and Service Access Filter roles. Application of certain AA-patterns
to the User Pull services is represented by three collaboration uses as illustrated in
Fig. 8:
User
Access Server
Service Access
Filter
UA
s1:
Tw
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authenticatee
UA
s2
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uth
s
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tiv
ati
on
auths
requestor
auths
granter
USaf2:Checking
Access Rights
authorisorauthorisee
UserPull
Figure 8: User Pull patterns
TwoPartyAuthenticate: This pattern, which we have modelled as a UML
2.0 collaboration in Fig. 4 and specialized for unilateral two pass authentication in
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, is shown in Fig. 8 bound to the User and Access Server roles.
Here, the authenticatee role is bound to the User role, and the authorisor
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role is bound to the Access Server role. For the instantiation of this pattern, it is
expected that an appropriate two party authentication pattern is chosen and applied as
described in Sect. 3.
Auths Activation: This pattern consists of a request by the instance playing
the authsrequestor role for authorizations to be activated and sent to the instance
playing the authsrequestor role. The authorizations govern which services the
user is allowed to access. The way in which the authorizations are activated depends
on the access control model that is used. This pattern is invoked after the collaboration
TwoPartyAuthenticate has reached its goal of e.g., unilaterally authenticating
the authenticatee. In the User Pull collaboration, Auths Activation is
shown bound to the User and Access Server roles.
CheckingAccessRights: This pattern is invoked whenever the instance play-
ing the User role requests access to a service. The instance playing the authoriser
role then checks the authorizations to establish whether the instance playing the User
role shall be granted access to the service. In the User Pull collaboration, Check-
ing Access Rights is shown bound to the User andService Access Fil-
ter roles.
Although not shown in the authentication and authorization patterns presented above,
an access control model is needed to administer access rights (permissions) and enforce
access control policies.
Several models for access control have evolved such as discretionary access control
(DAC), mandatory access control (MAC), and others [12]. A detailed overview of
different access control models is given in [56]. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
has emerged as a scalable alternative, and has been the focus area for recent research
on access control resulting in numerous model variants. In this report, we assume that
a RBAC model is used with the AA-patterns.
RBAC-role activation rules, and authorization rules are administered by the RBAC
infrastructure, and distributed to the AA-patterns and services. Therefore, there must
be an interface from the Access Server towards an RBAC infrastructure. For an
RBAC model and an approach to modelling RBAC policies using UML, see [35]. Ac-
cess control policies are enforced based on RBAC-role activation rules and author-
ization rules. RBAC-activation rules are used to manage and activate RBAC-roles ac-
quired by the agent. For example, a service role may or may not be allowed to be played
by an agent depending on the RBAC-roles acquired by the agent. See Appendix D for
for a more detailed discussion.
5 AA-patterns and policy
In [27], a policy is defined as information which can be used to modify the behavior of a
system. This definition of policy covers as such role-binding constraints as well as user
preferences, but also constraints on the triggering of behavior between components.
During service execution, dynamic role-binding provides a means for governing
service execution as outlined in [7], using a policy-driven approach to control invoca-
tion of service roles. Our classification and approach to specification of policies is also
motivated by [15] and by [29].
In our policy driven approach to composing AA-patterns with services we are con-
cerned with defining selective mechanisms for enabling the joint behavior of objects
rather than one object individually. As such policies should make it possible to provide
information on sequencing of collaborative behavior as well as the triggering of collab-
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orative behavior when policy constraints are fulfilled. It should be possible to provide
information on the ordering of service goals as well as the relationship between col-
laboration uses composed to provide services. One way of doing this is expressing a
composition policy as a UML2.0 dependency between two collaboration uses involved
in a composed service as illustrated in Fig. 14.
Our notion of a role-binding policy specifies requirements/objectives specifically
for the instance playing a certain role in the collaboration. This includes e.g. con-
straints the role imposes on any agent it may be bound to as well as conditions an
agent may pose regarding which roles may be bound to that agent depending on agent
states and preferences. Role-binding policies typically consist of context dependent
constraints. In the context of authentication patterns, a collaboration policy is as such
a requirement/objective for the collaborative behavior of the authentication pattern as
a whole, whereas the role-binding polices are defined specifically for each of the two
collaboration roles, authenticatee and authenticator.
Role-binding policies associated with a role may consist of:
• Role requirements, e.g. on which properties the instance (agent) playing the role
must have in order to successfully participate in the collaboration. For example,
for the unilateral two pass authentication pattern shown in Fig. 6, any instance
playing the authenticatee role must possess a secret.
• Agent requirements, which may specify constraints on what the agent playing
the role is allowed to do or which agents are allowed to play the role, e.g., only a
UserAgent is allowed to play the authenticatee role. The constraint may
specify requirements that the agent must satisfy in order to play the role, e.g., in
order for the collaboration to be successful with respect to service availability
requirements.
• Deployment requirements, e.g., requirements for the platform that the role is
deployed on in order for the collaboration to be successful with respect to service
availability requirements. For example, an instance playing the authentica-
tee role must be able to generate a response. This means that agent playing
the role must be deployed on a part of the physical system with the required
capacity available.
A collaboration role participating in an AA-pattern may have requirements on what
the agent must be able to support in order to play a role. We therefore need to determine
that the agent has the properties/characteristics required in order to play the role, such
as support for a specific algorithm. If it is determined that the algorithm to be used is
not supported, it may also be possible to download this (as a sort of extension to the
role play) to the agent allowing for the role to be played anyway.
A role-binding policy held by an agent defines conditions and constraints on which
roles can be played by the agent and defines rules in terms of:
• Pre-conditions for invoking a role such as conditions on the other agent involved
in the collaboration or conditions on which roles shall have been performed (e.g.
AA-roles).
• Preferences of the agent, such as types or multiplicities of roles that can be bound
to the agent.
• Deployment conditions. This provides e.g., Information about the resources
available. This may include information about the type of terminal/node/user
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equipment that the agent is deployed on, e.g., the terminal is a 3G telephone with
a smartcard, information about the operating System/ or software supported, and
other contextual parameters. Essentially, providing information about which ser-
vice availability constraints can be met by the platform the agent is deployed on
and which influence whether or not a role can be played by an agent.
For example, the policy held by a user agent A may state that user agent A is only
allowed to participate in a voicecall service, playing the callee role if the user
agent playing the caller role has been authenticated, authorized, and identified, and
the invitation is received between 6 PM and 11 PM.
5.1 Specifying policies
Most of the work in the literature on defining policies focuses on organizational policies
e.g. RBAC policies and Role Based Management (RBM) policies in which a role is an
organizational concept representing the specification of the behavior associated with a
particular position in the organizational context [26]. Although policies for governing
service execution are addressed in [7], specification of rules for defining such policies
is not addressed. An architecture for policy definition and call control policies is given
in [36] and provides some high level ideas for defining policies for use in enhancing
and controlling features in the context of call control in telecommunication services.
In this section, we refine some of these ideas and we provide our approach to defining
policies.
Definition: A policy is a rule of the following form: If condition C and trigger T
then action A and goal B.
• The condition part defines constraints on its applicability. The constraints are
predicates which restrict role behavior in service composition. We may specify
constraints as invariants, and pre and post conditions in OCL, or more specific-
ally, in Ponder [9].
• The trigger part describes when the policy should be applied. The trigger is the
event that e.g. invokes the execution of a collaboration subject to the constraints
stated in the condition part. The trigger part of a policy for governing service
invocation is important for achieving dynamic linking in service composition.
The trigger is specified as a message in UML 2.0, e.g., a signal or call.
• The action part defines what is to be done when the trigger event has been sent
given that the constraints stated in the condition part hold. Examples of actions
are: bind role r to agent A, and execute collaboration C.
• The goal part defines what is the desired result when the policy is applied. These
goals may be specified as post-conditions in OCL.
Although a trigger part is not specified in policy rules in general, e.g. in [15], the
trigger part is essential for applying a policy approach to service engineering. For a
role-binding policy, the trigger establishes when the policy applies, e.g., when the role
request message is sent. Specifying composition policies allows us to make relation-
ships between collaboration uses explicit as well as providing a means for sequencing
service goals. e.g., a composition policy may state that the goal unilaterally-
authenticated must be achieved before the goal auths activated can be
achieved.
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The following outlines how policy is applied in our modeling:
1. The role-binding and composition policies are specified using e.g., OCL. Policy
conditions are stated as invariants, and pre- and post conditions. Triggers and
policy actions are stated as UML operations, and goals as post-conditions. For
example, if the invariants and pre-conditions stated in the role-binding policy are
satisfied, then the instance can play the role. Another example is use of compos-
ition policies to demonstrate dynamic linking of collaboration uses. The com-
position policy is declared as a UML 2.0 dependency of type ≪policy≫. For
example, the composition policy may declare that a pre-condition for the execu-
tion of one collaboration may be that the instantiation of another collaboration
has reached a certain goal. These policies are specified at design time.
2. At design time static checks are performed on e.g., the projection from an actor’s
state machine to the semantic interface. Checks are performed on role compli-
ance. This includes checking that the actor satisfies the conditions and properties
given in the role-binding policy. This implies that the actor is typed with the in-
terface.
3. At run-time, policy controls are performed on the interfaces, dynamically. At
run-time it is enough to check that both instances are of the types that are required
on the semantic connector. Whether collaboration policy is satisfied is checked,
as well as checking e.g., whether access control policy rules are satisfied.
4. Access Control Policy enforcement is performed dynamically in an instantiation
of the Checking Access Rights collaboration by the instance playing the
authorisor role.
We have found that it is useful to declare the role binding policies in the semantic
interfaces for use in validation that the security properties are preserved in composition
of the pattern with services.
6 Composing AA-patterns and services statically
AA-patterns behavior may be invoked in two different situations:
When creating a new session, by performing a role request and performing dynamic
role binding. This requires general mechanisms to ensure that the role is invoked only
if authentication and authorization policies are satisfied. If role r is requested, and a
policy specifies that authentication and authorization is performed first, then the neces-
sary AA-behavior must be performed first and a desired goal must be reached before
the service is invoked. In this case an AA-goal is a precondition for the service invoc-
ation.
During session behavior, this is required when the session and its roles contains
features or accesses objects that demand fine-grained, dynamic authentication and/or
authorization. This case is trickier because it requires a tighter integration of service
behavior and AA-behavior. In our work, we model this using service access filters, and
policies, e.g. restricting role behavior. This entails adding screening behavior that fil-
ters out unauthorized operations. It also requires that it may be possible to force termin-
ation of a session if authorizations are no longer valid. We have currently modeled this
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as an Interrupt collaboration. Another approach is to invoke a restricted role beha-
vior only capable of doing authorized operations. Applying the appropriate role-based
access control model for issuing authorizations, and checking authorizations upon ac-
cessing a particular service or object makes such fine-grained, dynamic authorization
possible.
VoIP Service : User  
VoIP Service
r1 : User r2 : Service
Goal: VoIP Service provided
P1
P3
Inviting
Connected Busy
Disconnected
Idle
Idle
Invite
Bye
OK Busy
Bye
End
VoIP Service : Service P2
Inviting
Connected Busy
Disconnected
Idle
Idle
Invite
Bye
OK Busy
Bye
End
Figure 9: VoIP service defined as a semantic interface
Let us assume a voice over IP (VoIP) service, VoIP Service, defined as a se-
mantic interface with roles r1 and r2 as shown in Fig. 9. We model the view showing
the user to VoIP service provider only, to keep the example simple. Further assume that
agent A requests a session of VoIP Service, and role r2 from agent B.
The collaborationVoIP Servicemay have a collaboration policy P3 specifying
that the agents playing r1 and r2, in our case agents A and B, shall be different agents.
The agents may specify conditions that govern which roles can be played by the agent.
Agent B may, for instance, specify that a precondition for invoking r2 is that agent A is
authenticated and authorized e.g. applying Userpull. Similarly, agentAmay specify
that a precondition for invoking r1 is that agent B is authenticated and authorized. It
is natural to express these conditions as part of the role-binding policies, using OCL.
If the AA-properties have not been established yet then, it is necessary to invoke
AA-services resulting in the desired AA-properties before invoking VoIP Service.
In the most general case agent A and agent B must negotiate and agree on the AA-
patterns to apply. In many cases agent B may select the patterns and return the decision
to agent A. Then the AA-services are performed and only if successful, is the reques-
ted VoIP Service invoked. In Fig. 10 we illustrate the mapping of the VoIP
Service collaboration to agents in the system, however, it should be noted that this
is not syntactically legal in UML 2.0 [32], although this would be useful.
In order to demonstrate composition of VoIP Service with AA-patterns, we decom-
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Figure 10: VoIP Service: binding roles to agents in service composition
pose VoIP Service as shown in Fig. 10. The collaboration Use Request for
Service represents the initial request for use of the VoIP service by the instance
playing the User role. There are several alternatives to determine what is a result
of this initial request. One option, is that a service manager is implemented in the
system, which in response to the request from the user determines that authentication
and authorization is required for access to the service. A set of AA-patterns is then
selected for composition with the service. Another alternative is that the instance play-
ing the Service role determines which AA-patterns are needed and that instances of
Service Access Filter are required to perform authentication and authorization, and if
successful, then the requested VoIP Service is invoked.
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Figure 11: VoIP Service composed with User Pull patterns
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As this report focuses primarily on modelling techniques/alternatives for enabling
static composition of AA-patterns and services at design time, we do not discuss the
dynamic linking that occurs from Fig. 10 to Fig. 11. We assume, therefore that the de-
cision to compose the AA-patterns with the VoIP Service as shown in Fig. 11, the col-
laboration VoIP Service with Access control, has been made. We now
discuss the different modelling techniques/alternatives for achieving static composi-
tion.
In Fig. 11 we demonstrate static composition of VoIP Service with the User
Pull authentication and authorization patterns. This involves re-use of the two collabor-
ations: Request for Service and ServiceUse. The re-use of these two pat-
terns is needed in order to enable the instance playing the ServiceAccessFilter
role to act as a proxy between the instance playing the User role, and the instance
playing the Service role. This enables the instance playing the Service role to
require authentication and authorization before allowing a user to access the service.
The VoIP Service session may require additional, fine grained authentication, and
authorization checks, however, and this calls for screening or other mechanisms dur-
ing service execution, unless it is possible to constrain the service that is invoked to
what is permitted. The instance playing the Service role, may require that these
additional, fine grained authentication, and authorization checks are performed by the
instance playing the ServiceAccessFilter role. We model these as the follow-
ing collaboration uses: UpdateAccessRights, for updating the status of the user
authorizations, and Interrupt, for terminating a service session if user authoriza-
tions are no longer valid.
AA-pattern collaborations describe reusable elements. During instantiation of a
collaboration, various checks are needed to ensure that the participating agents can
satisfy requirements, conditions and properties, stated in policies.
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Figure 12: Diagram showing composition of collaboration uses, ordered in top down
sequence
Role-binding policies are used to check the compatibility of the role with the agent
playing the role. When binding roles, the semantic interface between two roles is
also bound, that is, the roles must also be compatible on a semantic interface with each
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other. Work on validating the compatibility of roles and consistency checking to ensure
the correctness of roles has been done by [13], [44], and [10].
Fig. 11 gives a graphical overview and provides a decomposition into interfaces
that are quite modular and reusable. However, the overall coordination (referred to as
choreography in the SOA context) is not evident. In addition to providing information
about the static structure, we also need to provide information about the ordering of
the associated behavior. Fig. 12 shows how roles in the different collaborations are
composed in and how these are ordered in a successful service execution.
As explained, above Section 4, for each of the two party collaborations we model
the behavior associated with the collaboration using semantic interfaces and goals. In
addition, a UML 2.0 interactions diagram corresponding to the semantic interface may
be designed for each collaboration. These can then be referred to in a UML 2.0 inter-
actions overview diagram such as in Fig.13.
sd UPinteractionsOverview
ref
UAs1.UniTwoPassAuthenticate
ref
UAs2.AuthsActivation
ref
USaf1.RequestServiceAccess
ref
USaf2.CheckingAccessRights
ref
USaf3.AAServiceUse
[Unilaterally Authenticated]
[NOT Authenticated]
[Not Activated]
[NOT Authorised]
[Authorised]
[Close]
ref
USaf4.CloseSession
Figure 13: Interactions overview diagram for composing sequence diagrams
There are several alternatives for modelling the sequencing of the behavior asso-
ciated with the collaboration uses shown. One alternative is use of an interactions
overview diagram as shown in Fig. 13. Such interaction overview diagrams are not
entirely suitable for expressing interrupting and disabling such as the termination of a
user session if authorizations are no longer valid. To model such dynamic exceptions,
a UML 2.0 activity diagram may be useful, modelling the dynamic exception using an
interruptible activity region [32].
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Modelling the Interrupt collaboration behavior in service composition is not
easy, as it constitutes an exception behavior. Indeed, the Interrupt collaboration
is an example of a forced feature interaction. Halvorsen and Haugen have presented a
method for handling exception in sequence diagrams in [16].
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Figure 14: Goal sequences with policies as UML 2.0 dependencies
A goal sequence [43] provides supplementary information to a collaboration dia-
gram. While a collaboration such as given in Fig. 11 provides static structural inform-
ation about the roles and collaboration uses involved in a composition of re-usable
units such as AA-patterns and services, a goal sequence provides additional inform-
ation about the ordering of dynamic behavior associated with the collaboration uses.
Fig. 14 models the positive sequence of behavior associated with the collaborations in
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order to achieve authenticated and authorized access to a service.
We have extended the idea of a goal sequence given in [43] to include modelling
composition policies as UML 2.0 dependencies with keyword <<policy >> as
illustrated in Fig. 14. This allows us to express constraints on the ordering of the
behavior associated with collaboration uses and may also allow us to express policies
governing dynamic interupt exceptions. The composition policies, modelled as UML
2.0 dependencies with keyword <<policy >> allow us to specify conditions that
must be true in order for the behavior associated with a collaboration use to execute.
Each instance of <<policy>> is annotated with the policy specified in OCL.
The policies declared provide additional information on conditions required for
the behavior to run correctly and according to availability requirements. The post-
conditions declare goals that have been defined at design time in the semantic interfaces
for the collaborations involved. For example, the goal unilaterally authenti-
cated is declared in the semanic intefrace for UTPA in Fig. 16.
As shown in Fig. 14, a collaboration policy is declared using OCL for the first col-
laboration use in the sequence, the instance UAs1 of UTPA. This collaboration policy is
declared at design time, when the UTPA collaboration is designed, along with UML 2.0
interactions and the semantic connector and its pair of semantic interfaces. The goal for
the collaboration,c.authenticatee.Unilaterally authenticated, is also
declared in the collaboration policy as an OCL post-condition. The reaching of this
goal, becomes a pre-condition in the composition policy declaring when the behavior
associated with the instance UAs2 of AA can execute.
We prefer to model the composition policies as UML 2.0 dependencies in a goal
sequence as apposed to declaring such policy dependencies in a UML2.0 collaboration
overview such as the overview shown in Fig. 11. This is because, the dependencies
would cross over several collaboration uses, and often cross each other, making the
result very difficult to read and understand. By using a goal sequence instead, the
policies can be expressed clearly, sequentially, and dynamically.
6.1 Steps for composing AA-patterns with services
We sum up our approach to composing AA-patterns at design time in the following
steps:
1. Determine which AA-patterns should be applied. In this step, it is determined
based on service availability requirements, which set of AA-patterns will be ap-
plied. This involves deciding whether AA-behavior should be applied separately
for each service in parallel, or whether some form of centralized authentication
and authorizations can be used, requiring that either the UserPull patterns or
ServerPull patterns should be applied. The decision to apply UserPull or
ServerPull involves deciding whether user authorizations will be stored on
a centralized access server, and presented by the access server to the service, or
whether authorizations will be distributed to the user and presented by the user
to the service. Regarding choice of authentication pattern to apply, we discuss
this in more detail in C.1.1
2. Decide whether sequential invocation at the beginning of a session only is suf-
ficient, or whether more fine grained control during session behavior is also re-
quired.
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3. Once the set of patterns to apply has been chosen, specifications/models for
each of the AA-patterns and the service to be composed are designed. These
are: UML 2.0 collaborations annotated with goals and a collaboration policy,
semantic interfaces annotated with role binding policies for each of the two par-
ticipating roles, and UML 2.0 interations. Declaring role-binding policies in
the semantic interface for each of the two collaborating roles involved in the
semantic connector will enable us to validate that the required conditions and
requirements have been fulfilled when composing the pattern with other AA-
patterns and services. The semantic connector may also be annotated with the
collaboration policy and goals.
4. Specification of the collaboration showing composition of AA-patterns with the
service (annotated with the collaboration policies. To supplement this collabora-
tion overview diagram, a goal sequence diagram is also provided, e.g. as shown
in Fig. 14.
5. Consistency checking of the model in the previous step using semantic inter-
faces. Consistency checks related to goals, and to role binding policies. In this
step we will also evaluate whether or not availability properties are preserved
under composition.
While these steps address static composition at design time, it is also possible that
agents representing users in the system, negotiate on behalf of end-users, service pro-
viders and system resources to achieve dynamic composition at run time, as we discuss
in the following section.
7 Dynamic role-binding using semantic interfaces
We define the semantic interfaces (SI) separately and validate (model check) each SI
type separately to ensure safety and liveness properties. In this sense, a semantic inter-
face is a type that may be used at design time to ensure the correctness of (static) as-
sociations and at runtime (as meta information) to ensure the correctness of (dynamic)
links.
Role binding policies declare requirements for the classes and instances a role may
be bound to. Actor/role types are then designed for the runtime system and are model
checked against the SI to validate that the interface behavior required by the collabor-
ation (e.g., UTPA) is satisfied.
In the meta data for the runtime system, this information is stored in files in the
database as part of the management system, and forms part of the data model for the
runtime system. In the meta data, we know that the instance can play the authenticatee
role of type responder in an instantiation of the UTPA collaboration and be able to
satisfy requirements regarding strength of authentication provided, and response times
involved in the exchange.
At runtime, dynamic role-binding is performed using the actor and SI type informa-
tion to ensure compatibility of dynamic links thereby guaranteeing that the links satisfy
the properties of the SI.
7.1 Example
The semantic connector for a specialization of the unilateral two pass authentication
pattern is given in Fig. 16 along with the UserAgent and Service Agent which
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represent user and service domain entities and resources, respectively. In order for an
instance of responder to be bound to the UserAgent, the role-binding policy P1
must be satisfied, similarly, for binding and instance of challenger to the Service
Agent. The role-binding policies have been specified in OCL for the roles involved
in the two party authentication pattern. For example, the OCL Boolean constraint
is generatable is declared to address performance aspects of the authentication
exchange. The aim is to ensure that the system resource on which the role/agent is
deployed is able to perform the operations involved in the authentication exchange
within QoS requirements.
<<QoS Characteristic>>
QoSTPADemand
<<QoS Characteristic>>
QoSTPAProvide
<<QoS Characteristic>>
UTPAQoSTPADemand
<<bind>>
{ Template parameter (End2EndUnit->ms)  }
<<bind>>
{ Template parameter (End2EndUnit->ms)  }
<<QoS Characteristic>>
UTPAQoSTPAProvide
Figure 15: UTPA QoS class definition
The OCL Boolean constraint is generatable has been defined using [33], and
is generatable evaluates to true means that the required QoS demanded by the
role in order to satisfy accessibility constraints is met by the offered QoS of the resource
in the deployment model. In order to represent the quality values we need to define
is generatable for use in dynamic role-binding, we define a simplified quality
model, as shown in Fig. 15 based on the Quality Model given in Annex B of [33]. In
this case, we resolve all temporal units with the unit milliseconds (ms). This simple
model may be expanded and refined with additional characteristics.
The OCL constraint is generatable is a Boolean check that is defined is OCL
as follows:
{ Context UTPA
if UTPAQoSTPAProvide ≤ UTPAQoSTPADemand
then self.authenticatee.generateMD5response.is generatable = true
else self.authenticatee.generateMD5response.is generatable = false
endif
}
The required QoS defines the maximum allowed time to generate the MD5 re-
sponse, and is specified on the SI type annotated to the statechart for the responder
role. In this case, the required QoS is the worst case for generating the MD5 response
is 10 ms. Similarly, the deployment model for the agents provides information about
the offered QoS of the resources. The offered QoS by the resource is 10 ms or better
for the agent that is to be validated against the required QoS. For this case, as shown in
Fig. 16, is generatable evaluates to true.
Support for java-based role-binding, and collaboration policies has been implemen-
ted in ServiceFrame [5]. Services can be specified by both end-users and service pro-
viders to handle availability properties. Extensions of ServiceFrame for validation in-
terface behavior by checking consistency are also being investigate by the students. Ex-
tensions for modelling collaborations and deriving interface behavior associated with
these have also been implemented. Work is ongoing regarding consistency of service
roles using semantic interfaces.
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UTPA 
authenticatee : 
responder
authenticator :  
challenger
UTPA  : responder UTPA : challenger
idle
Unilaterally_Authenticated
{ goal  =  true }
GenerateMD5
Response
GenerateMD5 
Challenge
ValidateMD5
Response
waiting
waiting
NotAuthenticated
P1 P2
Challenge
Challenge
Response
Response
Ok NOk
Unilaterally_Authenticated NotAuthenticated
Ok NOk
[MD5Response
Valid]
[MD5Response
 NOTValid]
{ Context c : UTPA 
Inv: 
c.authenticatee.GenerateMD5Response.is_generatable 
c.authenticatee.MD5.is_supported
Pre: 
c.authenticatee.username.is_assigned
c.authenticatee.passwd.is_assigned    }
{Context c : UTPA 
Inv: 
c.authenticator.GenerateMD5Challenge.is_generatable 
AND 
c.authenticator.ValidateMD5Response.is_validatable 
Pre: 
c.authenticator.knows_username AND 
c.authenticator.knows_passwd      }
<<QoS required>>
{Context  UTPAQoSTPADemand
WorstCaseExecutionTime = 10 ms  }
agents
A : User Agent B : Service Agent
<< QoS offered>>
{ Context UTPAQoSTPAprovided 
WorstCaseExecutionTime = 10 ms  
}
authenticatee 
: responder
authenticator  
: challenger
S : UTPA
idle idle
idle
Figure 16: Semantic connector for a specialization of the unilateral two pass authen-
tication pattern
8 Related work
Yoder and Barcalow [58] were the first to apply design patterns to the security domain
presenting the Single Access Point Pattern in [58]. In [8], patterns for authoriza-
tion and access control are addressed. Brown, Divietri, Villegas, and Fernandez have
documented a high level design pattern for authentication of clients to a server [6].
Consistent with our approach, the pattern allows for the implementation of different
authentication methods such as password-based, challenge response, or multiple chal-
lenge response. However, our approach to designing patterns allows for application
of the authentication pattern to the peer-to-peer environment as well. Additionally, we
provide a means to specify more details at later stages of development depending on
the requirements of the authentication protocol and algorithm. In [11], Fernandez and
Warrier provide an authorization pattern, integrated with a variant of the authentic-
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ator pattern. This authorizer pattern is actually an application of Yoder and Barcalows
single-point-of-check pattern [58], and is also an example of a server pull authentica-
tion and authorization architecture. Although these and other different authors have ad-
dressed authentication patterns and authorization patterns separately, we are not aware
that a framework addressing authentication and authorization patterns exists. To our
knowledge, application of such a framework to service composition is also a new ap-
proach.
9 Conclusion
We have presented a framework of authentication and authorization patterns together
with a policy-driven approach to composing services and AA-patterns to restrict access
to services to authorized users only. This involves specification of the AA-patterns us-
ing UML 2.0 collaborations and semantic interfaces annotated with policies specified
using OCL. We have demonstrated that our framework can be applied to static and
dynamic composition of services. Furthermore, we have demonstrated how the spe-
cifications may be annotated with role-binding policies, collaboration policies, and
composition policies to enable us to validate that required conditions and availability
properties hold when composing AA-patterns with services.
This policy-driven approach is useful for application to service composition be-
cause there are significant differences between different authentication techniques that
must be modelled for use in service composition, depending on the service collabora-
tion roles and service behavior involved as well as differences in the resources available
in the deployment platform. This validates the need for a finer-grained classification of
authentication patterns as discussed above in Sect. 3 and in Appendix C.
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A Definitions
This appendix contains a list of definitions of terms used in this report. The definitions
are obtained from international standards to the extent possible, and from established
sources in the literature. For terms that are defined differently in the standards, the
order of prioritization is as follows: [17] first, then [24], [49], and [48].
Access control: The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource, including the pre-
vention of use of a resource in an unauthorized manner [17].
Accessibility: The quality of being at hand and usable when needed [38].
an entity may be traced uniquely to the entity [17].
Asset: Anything that has value to the organisation [24].
Authentication: A property by which the correct identity of an entity or party is es-
tablished with a required assurance. The party being authenticated could be a
user, subscriber, home environment or serving network [51].
Authorization: The granting of permission based on authenticated identification [17].
Authorized: Granted rights or permissions [48].
Availability: The property of being accessible and usable on demand by an authorized
entity [17, 24].
Challenge: A data item chosen at random and sent by the verifier to the claimant,
which is used by the claimant, in conjunction with secret information held by
the claimant, to generate a response which is sent to the verifier [19].
Claimant: An entity which is or represents a principal for the purposes of authentica-
tion. A claimant includes the functions necessary for engaging in authentication
exchanges on behalf of a principal [19].
Confidentiality: The property that information is not made available or disclosed to
unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes [24].
Cryptographic algorithm: An algorithm that employs the science of cryptography,
including encryption algorithms, cryptographic hash algorithms, digital signa-
ture algorithms, and key agreement algorithms. [48].
Entity authentication: The corroboration that an entity is the one claimed [19].
Exclusivity: The ability to ensure access for authorized users only [38].
Identification data: Sequence of data items, including the distinguishing identifier for
an entity, assigned to an entity and used to identify it [23].
Mutual authentication: Entity authentication which provides both entities with as-
surance of each other’s identity [19].
Response: Data item sent by the claimant to the verifier, and which the verifier can
process to help check the identity of the claimant [23].
Threat: A potential cause of an unwanted event, which may result in harm to a system
or organisation and its assets [24].
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Token: A message consisting of data fields relevant to a particular communication
and which contains information that has been transformed using a cryptographic
technique [19].
Trusted third party: A security authority or its agent, trusted by other entities with
respect to security-related activities. A trusted third party is trusted by a claimant
and/or a verifier for the purpose of authentication [19].
Unilateral authentication: Entity authentication which provides one entity with as-
surance of the other’s identity but not vice versa [19].
Unwanted incident: Incident such as loss of confidentiality, integrity and/or availab-
ility [49].
Usable: Capable of being used [38].
Verifier: An entity which is or represents the entity requiring an authenticated iden-
tity. A verifier includes the functions necessary for engaging in authentication
exchanges [19].
Vulnerability: A weakness of an asset group or group of assets, which can be ex-
ploited by one or more threats [24].
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AKA Authentication and Key Agreement
AUTN Authentication Token
DAC Discretionary Access Control
ETSI European Telecommunications Standardization Institute
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IMPI IMS private identity
IMS IP multimedia subsystem
IP Internet Protocol
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message-Digest algorithm 5
OCL Object Constraint Language
PPTP Point-to-Point Tunnelling Protocol
QoS Quality of Service
RAND random challenge
RBAC Role-Based Access Control
RBM Role Based Management
RES Authentication response
SOA Service Oriented Architecture
SQN Sequence Number
UML Unified Modelling Language
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
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This appendix provides our full classification of authentication techniques and proto-
cols as authentication patterns.
C.1 Classification of authentication patterns
Authentication is the process of determining who you are. More specifically, entity
authentication is the corroboration that an entity is the one claimed [19]. (So in terms
of the definition of a pattern given in [2] , the problem being solved is identifying an
entity, and the recurring solution is authentication.) The basis of identification may be
one or more of the following:
• Something the entity knows (such as a password, PIN, or secret information);
• Something the entity possesses (such as a smartcard, SIM card, or a hardware
token);
• Something inherent to the entity (e.g., human physical characteristics such as
fingerprints or retinal characteristics).
Authentication theory and practice has evolved over time and is well established
in the literature [4, 28, 30], as well in the standards [18–20, 22, 23]. Authentication
techniques are normally described as protocols. Needham and Schroeder [30] in 1978
presented some protocols for authentication in computer networks, the first major con-
tribution to classifying techniques for authentication. Menezes, van Oorschot, and Van-
stone, in their book on applied cryptography [28], provide extensive material on crypto
protocols for authentication. Recently, Boyd and Mathuria [4] have published a book
on authentication protocols which aims to exhaustively present each existing protocol.
However, as the authors discovered, this is a formidable task, which is complicated by
the fact that new protocols are still emerging to meet the needs of the changing tele-
communications environment, such as the authentication protocol we have presented
in [39]. Indeed, standardisation organisations assign the task of creating new protocols
and algorithms for telecommunications services as needed. For example, the European
Telecommunications Standardisation Institute (ETSI), has a technical group, that is
responsible for creating cryptographic algorithms and protocols [42].
In order to apply authentication protocols and techniques in a model-based ap-
proach, we have classified these well-known techniques and protocols as authentication
patterns specified using UML 2.0 collaborations which may be combined with services
in service composition. Our classification is motivated by the need to address behavi-
oral considerations in the patterns. This means classification based first on the service
provided, unilateral authentication or mutual authentication, then based on the number
of messages involved in the pattern, e.g., one message for a one pass authentication
protocol, two messages for a two pass authentication protocol. The aim is to make the
developer more conscious in the choice of authentication techniques to apply, while
allowing flexibility with respect to the choice of protocols and algorithms and other
crypto techniques to be used.
The authentication patterns we investigate are:
1. Unilateral authentication patterns:
(a) One pass authentication
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(b) Two pass authentication
2. Mutual authentication patterns:
(a) Two pass authentication
(b) Three pass authentication
This list may be expanded to include patterns involving trusted third parties such
as adding patterns for mutual four and five pass authentication involving a trusted third
party [22].
UniOnePass
Authenticate
Unilateral
Authenticate
TwoParty
Authenticate
Mutual
Authenticate
UniTwoPass
Authenticate
MTwoPass
Authenticate
MThreePass
Authenticate
Figure 17: Authentication patterns
Fig. 17 shows our classification of authentication patterns. A generic two party
authentication pattern involves communication between the two parties to establish the
identity of one of the parties in the case of unilateral authentication, or both in the case
of mutual authentication. Messages are generated and exchanged between the parties,
at least one message/pass is required for unilateral authentication, and at least two mes-
sages/passes are required for mutual authentication. These are generic patterns that do
not bind a particular protocol or algorithm. The rational behind our classification is to
describe the generic pattern first based on type of authentication provided (unilateral or
mutual) and number of passes/messages involved. Once a generic pattern is selected,
the authentication pattern can be further differentiated in specializing the pattern de-
pending on the type of keying, e.g., symmetric or asymmetric, to be used. The generic
patterns are then further specialized with respect to the authentication technique, or
cryptographic protocol and algorithm(s) to be applied, e.g., for the unilateral two-pass
authentication pattern, the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) digest authentication
protocol with the MD5 hash algorithm may be applied [14].
The unilateral one pass authentication pattern may be specialized as illustrated in
the UML 2.0 class diagram shown in Fig. 18. There is a class for all unilateral one pass
patterns employing symmetric crypto techniques, that is for which the authenticating
party and the party requesting authentication share a common secret key, which is used
in the crypto protocol. Similarly, there is a class for all unilateral one pass patterns
employing asymmetric crypto techniques, and a class for all patterns for which the
unilateral one pass authentication algorithm employs a hash function.
Each of these may be specialized further depending on the choice of protocol, al-
gorithm and key size. Fig. 18 shows specializations for some standardized authen-
tication protocols and algorithms. For example, the UniOnePass Authenticate
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Figure 18: Classification of some unilateral one pass authentication patterns
pattern may be specialized as the UniOnePass Authenticate pattern using an
unkeyed hash function. For this specialization, MD5, a cryptographic hash function
that produces a 128-bit hash value, which is also often referred to as a message digest,
may be chosen. This MD5 digest may be used in the unilateral one pass authentica-
tion pattern for authenticating a password, e.g. by using the username and password
as input. However, it should be noted that authentication using a simple MD5 hash is
not considered secure due to well-known attacks on the MD5 algorithm, as discussed
in [57] and in [50].
Similarly, the UniOnePass Authenticate pattern may be specialized with
respect to public key-based crypto or private key-based crypto. In the case that public
key-based crypto is chosen, the ISO/IEC 9798-3 5.1.1 one pass authentication protocol
may be applied [20]. In this case, as shown in Fig. 25 of Sect. C.2.1, which gives the
UML2.0 interactions diagram for the unilateral one pass pattern, the claim signal
contains the instance playing the authenticatee role’s public key certificate con-
catenated with the TokenAB. For details regarding the form of the token, see [20].
The token may contain a sequence number or a time stamp as a time variant parameter.
An identifier for the instance playing the authenticator role is included in the
token to ensure that the token is accepted by the intended recipient. This informa-
tion is digitally signed along with some additional text using the private signature key
belonging to the instance playing the authenticatee role. Candidate signature al-
gorithms are chosen from e.g., the digital signature algorithm (DSA), the secure hash
function (SHA) of the Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) system or the elliptic curve
DSA (ECDSA) of the elliptic curve system (ECM). For more information about these
systems, and how to select the appropriate cryptographic key size, see [25].
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Figure 19: Classification of some unilateral two pass authentication patterns
Fig. 19 shows examples of specializations of unilateral two pass authentication
patterns. The UML 2.0 interaction diagrams for the specialization of the unilateral
two pass authentication using HTTP digest with MD5 as defined in [14] is shown
in Fig. 31 in Section C.2.2 below. This example has been chosen as HTTP digest
with MD5 is commonly used in voice over IP deployments, although the protocol and
algorithm suffer from many known limitations. There are limitations simply because
it is a password-based system, but also due to the known weaknesses of the MD5
algorithm [50, 57].
MTwoPass 
Authenticate
MTwoPass 
Authenticate
Symmetric
MTwoPass 
Authenticate
Asymmetric
 ISO/IEC 9798-2
5.2.1 Two pass 
authentication 
 ISO/IEC 9798-3
5.2.1 Two pass 
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Authenticate crypto 
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IMS AKA
IMS AKA reuses the UMTS AKA mutual two 
pass authentication protocol for authentication 
between the user and the IP multimedia 
subsystem (IMS). The only difference is how 
the parameters are transported for  IMS AKA. 
The means for transporting the parameters is 
explained in rfc 3310 – Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication using 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA).
Figure 20: Classification of some mutual two pass authentication patterns
Similarly, Fig. 20 and Fig. 21 show examples of specializations of mutual two pass
authentication patterns and mutual three pass authentication patterns, respectively. One
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specialization of the MTwoPassAuthenticate pattern for symmetric key-based
protocols as shown in Fig. 20 is the IP multimedia subsystem (IMS) authentication and
key agreement (AKA) protocol [52]. The IMS AKA protocol was standardized by the
third generation partnership project (3GPP) to provide a more secure alternative to the
HTTP digest algorithm for authenticating 3GPP users to the IMS. IMS AKA extends
HTTP digest by providing mutual authentication and using stronger cryptographic al-
gorithms. IMS AKA is also stronger because it is symmetric key-based, using the
symmetric key safely contained on a smart card.The UML 2.0 interaction diagrams for
the specialization of the mutual two pass authentication protocol IMS AKA, is given
in Fig. 37 of Section C.3.1.
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Figure 21: Classification of some mutual three pass authentication patterns
C.1.1 Choosing and applying an authentication pattern
In order to determine the generic pattern and specialisation to be applied, we need to
consider what the authentication requirements for a specific service or service compon-
ent are: which authentication pattern is sufficient to ensure e.g. that the user identity
is verified? Is mutual authentication required? Do service requirements place restric-
tions on the number of passes allowed? What about the strength of the authentication
required? Is single factor sufficient or is a stronger authentication required e.g. using
two factor as in the case of GSM authentication? The choice of authentication pattern
will depend on service requirements. Additionally, when it comes to instantiating the
pattern and binding roles to agents, service requirements such as timing constraints,
or maximum delay contribution due to application of the authentication pattern should
be addressed. For example, a service requirement may specify that the processing in-
volved due to the computations involved must not exceed x ms. In order to meet this
requirement, the computational burden of the different algorithms must be considered.
Most asymmetric crypto algorithms have very long keys, and thus cause delays which
may be unacceptable. An example of a service with such strict requirements is a voice
over IP service.
Choosing the appropriate authentication pattern to apply depends on several factors
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including service requirements and constraints as well as different aspects of service
composition design. A decision must first be made as to whether unilateral authentic-
ation is sufficient, or whether mutual authentication is required. For client server type
services, it is general practice to use unilateral authentication, that is, the server au-
thenticates the clients. However, in a multi-service provider environment, the need for
authentication of the server as well should be evaluated. Or, if there is a risk of mas-
querading servers in the service environment, then mutual authentication should be
implemented. Then, the number of passes required should be evaluated. For example,
unilateral two pass authentication provides a possibility for stronger authentication than
unilateral one pass authentication. This is because unilateral two pass authentication
involves a remote challenge response sequence whereas unilateral one pass does not.
Once a generic pattern is selected, the authentication pattern can be further differ-
entiated in specializing the pattern depending on the type of keying, e.g., symmetric
or asymmetric, to be used. The patterns is then further specialized with respect to the
authentication technique, or cryptographic protocol and algorithm(s) to be applied. A
protocol may be chosen from the existing protocols available, or an original protocol
may be specified. The advantage of choosing from known protocols and algorithms
is that these have been subject to scrutiny and cryptanalysis, so that any weaknesses
known have been published. For example, for authentication of a user to a web-based
service, the unilateral two-pass authentication pattern may be chosen, using the HTTP
digest authentication protocol with the MD5 hash algorithm [14].
We summarize this approach in three steps:
• First choose a generic two party authentication pattern.
• Then Choose the type of keying, e.g., symmetric or asymmetric, to be used.
• Finally, Specialize with respect to authentication technique, or crypto protocol
and algorithm(s) to be applied. This step will also involve a decision on type of
key, and length of key to be used.
By establishing such a stepwise selection process, we separate out the choices that
must be made by the developer, and pinpoint each of the levels of specialization for
awareness.
Deciding on the appropriate specialization required will involve an evaluation of
the risks of abuse/misuse by unauthorized user(s), e.g. allowing an attacker to gain
access to a specific service or service component. The strength of authentication re-
quired is chosen to mitigate the risks. In further work, we may provide a classification
of known protocols and algorithms using this framework to assist in chosing the appro-
priate pattern and specialization. This classification may also classify attacks (threat
scenarios) followed by the appropriate pattern(s) that may be applied to counter the
attack and reduce the risk of unauthorized access.
We specify the authentication patterns for modelling in service composition using
the UML 2.0 Collaboration concept [32] which provides a structured way to define
services in terms of collaborating roles and a means to decompose/compose services
using collaboration uses. To specify behavior associated with the collaborations we use
UML 2.0 interaction [32]. The authentication patterns are modelled as UML 2.0 two
party collaborations allowing reuse, and may be composed with service components
or parts that are also modelled as UML 2.0 two party collaborations. In the generic
patterns, we specify policies, as explained in Sect. 5, with properties/requirements on
the instances playing the roles independent of choice of protocol, algorithm, keying
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that are chosen in later stages of specialization. This allows for re-use of a pattern,
while also allowing easy adaptation and adjustment depending on the requirements.
 
TwoPartyAuthenticate
authenticatee authenticator
Figure 22: UM 2.0 collaboration diagram for the two party authentication pattern
A UML 2.0 collaboration diagram for the generic two party authentication pattern
is given in Fig. 22. The collaboration diagram shows that the authenticatee role
cooperates with the authenticator role. In the following sections, we present the
specializations of the generic two party authentication pattern for the unilateral and
mutual authentication patterns, modelled using UML2.0.
C.2 Unilateral authentication patterns
In unilateral authentication patterns, only one of the two parties is authenticated.
C.2.1 Unilateral one pass authentication
In this pattern, the instance playing the authenticatee role initiates the process
and sends one message containing a Claim, and optionally other data (such as a pub-
lic key certificate) to the instance playing the authenticator role. The form of
the Claim varies depending on the crypto protocol chosen, and usually involves a
time variant parameter and or a time stamp, and consists of a cleartext part, and an
encrypted part. The data used as a basis for generating the Claim will depend on
the crypto protocol to be implemented. For example, if the crypto protocol used in
the implementation is the ISO/IEC 9798-2 one-pass unilateral authentication protocol,
a one-pass symmetric key unilateral authentication protocol, then a shared secret key,
which is used by both the instance playing the authenticator role and the instance
playing the authenticatee role, and a symmetric algorithm are used [22]. The ac-
tual generation of Claim in an instantiation of the pattern will depend on the protocol
and algorithm employed.
{def: goal : Boolean = authenticatee.Unilaterally_Authenticated}
UniOnePassAuthenticate
authenticatee :
claimant
authenticator :
verifier
Figure 23: Unilateral one pass authentication
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The collaboration diagram for the unilateral one-pass authentication pattern is given
in Fig. 23. This view shows the goal for the collaboration, defined as a boolean in OCL.
The goal for the pattern is that the instance playing the authenticatee role is unilaterally
authenticated (by the instance playing the authenticator role). A detailed view of the
pattern is give in Fig. 24. This view allows us to express more concisely the properties
that the instances must have in order to participate in the pattern. Any instance play-
ing the authenticatee role must possess the properties specified by claimant
and any instance playing the authenticator role must possess the properties spe-
cified by verifier. The instance playing the authenticatee role must possess a
secret, and the instance playing the authenticator role must possess knowledge
that is mathematically related to the secret.
UniOnePass Authenticate
claimant
secret : string
GenerateClaim ()
verifier
knowledge : string
ValidateClaim ()
authenticatorauthenticatee
{ Context  c:UniOnePassAuthenticate
Inv:
c.authenticatee.GenerateClaim.is_generatable AND
c.authenticator.ValidateClaim.is_validatable
Pre:
c.authenticatee.secret.is_assigned AND
c.authenticator.knowledge.is_assigned AND
Relation (c.authenticatee.secret, c.authenticator.knowledge) }
Figure 24: UML 2.0 Collaboration diagram for unilateral one-pass authentication, de-
tailed view
Two invariants are declared: c.authenticatee.GenerateClaim.is gen-
eratable and c.authenticator.ValidateClaim.is validatable. The
first invariant is used to check that the instance playing the the authenticatee role
is deployed on a part of the system (terminal/node) with the required processing and
computing capacity required to generate the Claim. Similarly, the second invariant is
used to check that the instance playing the authenticator role is deployed on a
part of the system (terminal/node) with the required processing and computing capacity
required to validate the Claim. The reason for declaring these invariants is to ensure
that the protocol and algorithm chosen are not too processor intensive for the parts on
which they are deployed so that the authentication protocol can run whenever the col-
laboration is instantiated. The motivation for this is to ensure that service requirements
regarding accessibility [38] are fulfilled when this authentication pattern is composed
with service components/parts. The two pre-conditions c.authenticatee.sec-
ret.is assigned and c.authenticator.knowledge.is assigned check
that secret and knowledge are assigned before the collaboration can instantiate. Addi-
tionally, Relation(c.authenticatee.secret,c.authenticator.know-
ledge) must evaluate to true. This means that there is a check performed to ensure
that there is a pre-existing mathematical relationship betweensecret andknowledge
as required by the authentication pattern to be deployed. The OCL pre-conditions are
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used to perform a boolean check to confirm that the a priori conditions for the authen-
tication protocol are fulfilled.
The purpose of these three boolean checks is to ensure that the a priori conditions,
for the authentication protocol to be used, have been satisfied in order for the instances
to successfully participate in the pattern. This means that the instances playing the
authenticatee and authenticator roles have been assigned secret and know-
ledge correctly by the runtime system prior to service execution.
To provide information about the interactions between the two instances playing the
authenticatee and authenticator roles respectively, a UML 2.0 interactions
diagram is used to show the interactions in time sequence. UML 2.0 interactions uses
are used for modelling authentication pattern behavior subject to service constraints
such as timing, processor capacity available, or strength of algorithm required. Fig. 25
provides the interactions diagram for the generic unilateral one-pass pattern, and shows
how we employ UML 2.0 interactions uses.
sd Claim
authenticatee : 
claimant
authenticator : 
verifier
Claim_signal
sd UniOnePassAuthenticate
authenticatee : 
claimant
authenticator : 
verifier
Validate 
Claim
ref
Claim
alt
Unilaterally_Authenticated
NotAuthenticated
[Claim  Valid]
Generate 
Claim
Ok_signal
NOk_signal
[Claim  Not Valid]
Figure 25: UML 2.0 interaction diagram for UniOnePass Authenticate
This pattern may be specialized for a particular protocol and algorithm(s) by spe-
cifying the Claim interactions diagram giving the detailed signal. We model the be-
havior involved in the so-called ”pass” using UML 2.0 interactions uses. Employing
interaction uses in this manner facilitates re-usability of the patterns as well as to enable
the ability to evaluate whether different crypto protocols and algorithms meet service
requirements in order to obtain the combination that best suits the service requirements
and other restrictions such as processor capacity in the deployed terminal when com-
posing the pattern with services.
This flexibility allows us to test during the design phase whether a certain protocol
fulfils requirements regarding strength of authentication provided. The classification
of authentication into levels depending on the strength of authentication provided is
out of the scope of this work, however, and we are not aware that a full classifica-
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{def: goal : Boolean = authenticatee.Unilaterally_Authenticated  }
 
Uni O ne Pa s s Aut he nt i c a t e
authenticatee : 
claimant
authenticator :  
verifier
UniOnePassAuthenticate : claimant UniOnePassAuthenticate : verifier
idle idle
Unilaterally_Authenticated
{ goal  =  true }
Generate 
Claim
waiting
Validate 
Claim
NotAuthenticated
idle
P1 P2
Claim
Claim
Ok NOk
Unilaterally_Authenticated NotAuthenticated
idle
Ok NOk
[Claim
Valid]
[Claim Not Valid]
Figure 26: UML 2.0 collaboration and semantic interfaces for the
UniOnePassAuthenticate pattern
tion of authentication protocols according to strength of authentication provided exists.
However, information about strength of specific algorithms and selection of key-size
for certain well-known public-key cryptography protocols and algorithms is provided
in [25]. We are also interested in obtaining a suitable reference to a classification of
crypto protocols, algorithms, and key-lengths used regarding processor intensivity in
order to take into account timing issues in service deployments. For example, a cer-
tain protocol and algorithm run on a mobile 3G terminal is known to use x ms. The
policy control check needs to determine whether x ms is within the constraints given in
the role-binding policy of the service that the authentication pattern is to be composed
with. If it is not within the limits, then another protocol and algorithm which is less
processor intensive will need to be chosen.
Fig. 23 and Fig. 25 are used to define the semantic interfaces for the unilateral
one pass authentication pattern. The semantic interfaces for the unilateral one pass
authentication pattern are given in Fig. 26, defining the visible interface behavior and
goals of the collaboration as explained in Sect. 4.1.2. In this case, it is a goal that
the instance playing the authenticatee role is unilaterally authenticated by the
instance playing the authenticator role. The two role state machines show the
role behavior of the two collaboration parts participating in the pattern. goal =
true is an (assertion [32], not an executable property). The assertion states that
the goal of unilaterally authentication has been achieved. The declarations P1 and
P2, in the upper corners of the two role state machines, represent the role-binding
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policies for each of the two collaborating parts respectively. for the instance play-
ing the authenticatee role and the instance playing the authenticator role.
See Fig. 27 for examples of role-binding policies for each of the two collaboration parts
involved in the UniOnePassAuthenticate pattern.
Fig. 27 provides examples of the condition parts of role-binding policies for the in-
stances playing the authenticatee and authenticator roles respectively, and
the condition part of the collaboration policy for the instantiation of the UniOnePass-
Authenticate pattern. The role-binding policy for the authenticatee role
states that the instance playing the authenticatee role must have the capacity to
generate the Claim at any time, and must have a pre-assigned secret. If these
two conditions are fulfilled then the instance can play the authenticatee role and
achieve its goal. If not fulfilled, role-binding may still be allowed, but the goal will not
be achieved. Similarly, the role-binding policy for the authenticator role states
that the instance playing the authenticator role must have the capacity to validate
the Claim at any time, and must have a pre-assigned knowledge (of the secret).
If these two conditions are fulfilled then the instance can play the authenticator
role. In order for the collaboration to run, both of these policies must be fulfilled.
{ Context  c:UniOnePassAuthenticate 
Inv: 
c.authenticatee.GenerateClaim.is_generatable
Pre: 
c.authenticatee.secret.is_assigned
 }
{ Context  c:UniOnePassAuthenticate 
Inv: 
c.authenticator.ValidateClaim.is_validatable
Pre: 
c.authenticator.knowledge.is_assigned AND
}
{ Context  c:UniOnePassAuthenticate 
Pre: 
Relation (c.authenticatee.secret, c.authenticator.knowledge) 
}
Figure 27: Examples of condition parts of role-binding policies and collaboration
policy for the UniOnePassAuthenticate pattern
The conditions part of these policies are declared in OCL. The operation performed
is a policy check: Before the role can be bound, the invariants and pre-conditions must
be satisfied. Given that these conditions are satisfied, the result of the policy check is
that the role can be bound.
Similarly, for the collaboration policy, before the collaboration can be instanti-
ated, the pre-condition that there is a mathematical relationship between secret and
knowledge must be evaluated. if this check results to true, and a trigger message
requesting authentication is sent, then the result of the policy check is that the collab-
oration can be instantiated/executed.
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C.2.2 Unilateral two pass authentication
In this pattern, the instance playing the authenticator role initiates the process
and sends a challenge to the instance playing the authenticatee role. Upon re-
ceiving this challenge, the instance playing the authenticatee role generates a
response and sends it back to the instance playing the authenticator role. The
response is validated. If the response is valid, then the authentication is successful.
{def: goal : Boolean = authenticatee.Unilaterally_Authenticated}
 
UniTwoPassAuthenticate
authenticatee : 
responder
authenticator : 
challenger
Figure 28: Unilateral two pass authentication
The instance playing the authenticator role sends a message containing a
Challenge, and optionally other data (such as a public key certificate) to the instance
playing the authenticatee role. The form of the Challenge varies depending
on the crypto protocol chosen, and usually involves a time variant parameter and or a
time stamp, and consists of a cleartext part, and an encrypted part. The data used as a
basis for generating the Challenge will depend on the crypto protocol to be imple-
mented. For example, if the crypto protocol used in the specialization is the ISO/IEC
9798-2 two-pass unilateral authentication protocol, a two-pass symmetric key unilat-
eral authentication protocol, then a shared secret key, which is used by both the instance
playing the authenticator role and the instance playing the authenticatee
role, and a symmetric algorithm are used [22]. The actual generation of Challenge
in an instantiation of the pattern will depend on the protocol and algorithm employed.
 
UniTwoPass Authenticate
responder
secret : string
GenerateResponse ()
challenger
challenge : string         
knowledge : string
GenerateChallenge ()
ValidateResponse ()
authenticatorauthenticatee
{ Context  c:UniTwoPassAuthenticate 
Inv: 
c.authenticatee.Generate Response.is_generatable AND 
c.authenticator.GenerateChallenge.is_generatable AND 
c.authenticator.ValidateResponse.is_validatable
Pre: 
c.authenticatee.secret.is_assigned AND 
c.authenticator.knowledge.is_assigned AND
Relation (c.authenticatee.secret, c.authenticator.knowledge) }
Figure 29: UML 2.0 collaboration diagram for unilateral two-pass authentication, de-
tailed view
The collaboration diagram for the unilateral two-pass authentication pattern is given
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in Fig. 28. A detailed view is given in Fig. 29. The properties of the authenticatee
role and authenticator role are defined by responder and challenger. As
for the unilateral one-pass pattern, the a priori conditions for instantiating the pattern
are expressed as constraints in OCL. In this case, three invariants are declared:
c.authenticator.GenerateChallenge.is generatable
c.authenticatee.GenerateResponse.is generatable
c.authenticator.ValidateResponse.is validatable
The first and third invariants are used to check that the instance playing the authenti-
cator role is deployed on a part of the system (terminal/node) with the required
processing and computing capacity required to generate the challenge and to valid-
ate the response. Similarly, the second invariant is used to check that the instance
playing the authenticatee role is deployed on a part of the system (terminal/node)
with the required processing and computing capacity required to generate the response.
The reason for declaring these invariants is to ensure that the protocol and algorithm
chosen are not too processor intensive for the parts on which they are deployed so
that the authentication protocol can run whenever the collaboration is instantiated.
The motivation for this is to ensure that service requirements regarding accessibil-
ity [38] are fulfilled when this authentication pattern is composed with service compon-
ents/parts. The two pre-conditions c.authenticatee.secret.is assigned
and c.authenticator.knowledge.is assigned check that secret and
knowledge are assigned before the collaboration can instantiate. The third pre-
condition checks that there is a mathematical relationship between secret and know-
ledge.
sd 
Challenge
authenticatee 
: responder
authenticator : 
challenger
Challenge_signal
sd 
Response
authenticatee 
: responder
authenticator:
challenger
Response_signal
sd UniTwoPassAuthenticate
authenticatee : 
responder
authenticator : 
challenger
Challenge
ref
 
Generate 
Challenge
Validate 
Response
ref
Response
alt
Unilaterally_Authenticated
NotAuthenticated
[Response  Valid]
Generate 
Response
NOk_signal
Ok_signal
[Response  NOTValid]
Figure 30: UML 2.0 interaction diagram for UniTwoPass Authenticate
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The interaction sequences for the unilateral two pass challenge response pattern are
given in Fig. 30. This diagram illustrates how we employ UML 2.0 interaction uses
to enable flexibility in the specification. The challenge and response interaction uses
referenced allow use of the same pattern to specify any unilateral two pass challenge
response protocol. Although the intention of interaction uses is to enable reuse of a
definition in many contexts, this feature also allows us to test which pair of interactions
should be used for the challenge and the response passes in order to determine which
best fit the requirements of the service. In this way, different protocols and algorithms
may be applied subject to constraints such as timing constraints. This is to assist in
selecting the protocol and algorithm that best fits the requirements. The Generate
Challenge, Generate Response, and Validate Response state invariants
depend on the protocol and algorithm chosen. In this way, the developer is able to tune
the authentication pattern to fit the service requirements, and then select, freeze, and
use.
sd 
Challenge
authenticatee 
: responder
authenticator : 
challenger
(realm, nonce)
sd 
Response
authenticatee 
: responder
authenticator:
challenger
(username, realm, 
nonce, URI, response)
Sd UTPA HTTP digest with MD5
authenticatee : 
responder
authenticator : 
challenger
Challenge
ref
 
Generate 
MD5Challenge
Validate 
MD5Response
ref
Response
alt
Unilaterally_Authenticated
NotAuthenticated
[MD5Response  Valid]
Generate 
MD5Response
NOk_signal
Ok_signal
[MD5Response 
 NOTValid]
response = MD5( MD5(A1), nonce:MD5(A2) )
               = MD5 ( MD5(A1) || : || nonce:MD5(A2) )
A1 = (username : realm : passwd )
A2 = (method : URI)
Figure 31: UML 2.0 interaction diagram for UniTwoPass Authenticate specialized for
the HTTP digest protocol using the MD5 hash
A specialization of UniTwoPass Authenticate using the HTTP digest pro-
tocol with the MD5 algorithm is shown in Fig. 31. For this specialization, the Chall-
enge signal contains the realm and nonce values, as explained in [14]. The realm
is a string displayed to the user (the instance playing the authenticatee role) con-
taining at least the name of the host performing the authentication. The nonce is a
data string which is uniquely generated by the instance playing the authenticator
role. The Response signal contains the username, realm, nonce, URI, and the
response which is generated using the MD5 algorithm. Note that although MD5 is
widely used with HTTP digest, the protocol actually specifies use of a checksum/hash
function and provides an example using MD5. In other words, MD5 is not mandatory,
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but is commonly used.
{def: goal : Boolean = authenticatee.Unilaterally_Authenticated  }
 
U n iT wo PassA u th en ticate  
authenticatee : 
responder
authenticator :  
challenger
UniTwoPassAuthenticate  : responder UniTwoPassAuthenticate  :challenger
idle
idle
Unilaterally_Authenticated
{ goal  =  true }
Generate 
Response
Generate  
Challenge
Validate
Response
waiting
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P1 P2
Challenge
Challenge
Response
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Ok NOk
Unilaterally_Authenticated NotAuthenticated
idle
Ok NOk
[Response  
   Valid] [Response  NOTValid]
Figure 32: UML 2.0 collaboration and semantic interfaces for the UniTwoPass
Authenticate pattern
In Fig. 32, the UML 2.0 collaboration for unilateral two-pass authentication is
shown with two state machines to show the role behavior of the two collaboration parts
in a unilateral two-pass challenge-response authentication pattern. These diagrams, to-
gether with goal expressions specifying properties of desirable states and events, define
the semantic connector of the UniTwoPassAuthenticate collaboration. In addi-
tion to syntactical interfaces, semantic interfaces define the visible interface behavior
and goals of the collaboration. In this case, the semantic connector defines the inter-
face behavior and goals of the authenticatee and authenticator roles. The
declarations in the upper corners of the role state machines represent the role-binding
policies for each of the two collaboration parts , represented by P1 and P2 respectively
for the instances playing the the authenticatee role and the instance playing the
authenticator role.
Fig. 33 provides examples of the condition parts of role-binding policies for the in-
stances playing the authenticatee and authenticator roles respectively, and
the condition part of the collaboration policy for the instantiation of the UniTwoPass-
Authenticate pattern. The role-binding policy for the authenticatee role
states that the instance playing the authenticatee role must possess a secret,
and it must have the capacity to be able to generate a response to the challenge sent by
the authenticator. If these conditions are fulfilled, then the instance can play the
authenticatee role. Similarly, the instance playing the authenticator role
must possess knowledge (that is mathematically related to the secret assigned to
the instance playing the authenticatee role), and it must be able to to generate a
54 C.3 Mutual authentication patterns
{ Context c:UniTwoPassAuthenticate 
Inv: 
c.authenticatee.Generate Response.is_generatable
Pre: 
c.authenticatee.secret.is_assigned
}
{ Context c:UniTwoPassAuthenticate 
Pre: 
Relation (c.authenticatee.secret, 
c.authenticator.knowledge)
}
{Context c:UniTwoPassAuthenticate 
Inv: 
c.authenticator.GenerateChallenge.is_generatable AND 
c.authenticator.ValidateResponse.is_validatable 
Pre: 
c.authenticator.knowledge.is_assigned  
 }
Figure 33: Examples of the condition parts of role-binding policies and collaboration
policy for the UniTwoPassAuthenticate pattern
challenge, which is sent to the authenticatee, and to validate the reponse. In
order for the collaboration to run, both of the role-binding policies must be fulfilled.
The condition part of the collaboration policy states that in order for the collabora-
tion to instantiate, there must be a mathematical relationship between secret and
knowledge.
C.3 Mutual authentication patterns
In mutual authentication patterns, both of the two parties are authenticated.
C.3.1 Mutual two pass authentication
In this pattern, the instance playing the authenticateeA role initiates the process
and sends a message containing a claim, ClaimAB, and optionally other data (such
as a public key certificate) to the instance playing the authenticateeB role. The
the instance playing the authenticateeB role must first validate this ClaimAB,
and if it is valid, then a claim, ClaimBA, is generated by the instance playing the
authenticateeB role and sent to the instance playing the authenticateeA
role. The instance playing the authenticateeA role must then validate ClaimBA,
and if it is also valid, then the instances are mutually authenticated.
The form of the claims generated varies depending on the crypto protocol chosen,
and usually involves a time variant parameter and or a time stamp, and consists of
a cleartext part, and an encrypted part. The data used as a basis for generating the
ClaimAB and the ClaimBA will depend on the crypto protocol to be implemented.
For example, if the crypto protocol used in the implementation is the ISO/IEC 9798-2
two-pass mutual authentication protocol, a two-pass symmetric key mutual authentic-
ation protocol, then a shared secret key, which is used by both the instance playing the
authenticator role and the instance playing the authenticatee role, and a
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symmetric algorithm are used [22]. The actual generation of ClaimAB, ClaimBA in
an instantiation of the pattern will depend on the protocol and algorithm employed.
MTwoPassAuthenticate
authenticateeA :
claimantA
authenticateeB :
claimantB
{def: goal : Boolean =
authenticateeA.Authct(authenticateeB) AND
authenticateeB.Authct(authenticateeA)}
Figure 34: Mutual two pass authentication
The collaboration diagram for the mutual two-pass authentication pattern is given
in Fig. 34. The properties of the authenticateeA role and authenticateeB
role are defined by claimantA and claimantB. This view shows the goal for the
collaboration, defined as a boolean in OCL. The goal for the pattern is that the in-
stance playing the authenticateeA role is authenticated (by the instance playing
the authenticateeB role) and that the instance playing the authenticateeB
role is authenticated (by the instance playing the authenticateeA role). A detailed
view is given in Fig. 35. As for the unilateral authentication patterns described above,
the a priori conditions for instantiating the pattern are expressed as constraints in OCL.
This is to establish that all of the requirements for the authentication protocol to run
successfully are fulfilled prior to running the authentication protocol. For example, if
the instance playing the authenticateeA role has not been assigned a secretA
ahead of time, then the authentication process will error when run. All of these con-
ditions must be established ahead of time for the authentication protocol to be able to
run. Having established a priori conditions, authentication can be performed whenever
authentication is required e.g. in a service collaboration.
MTwoPass Authenticate
claimantA
secretA : string
GenerateClaimAB ()
ValidateClaimBA ()
claimantB
secretB : string
GenerateClaimBA ()
ValidateClaimAB ()
authenticateeBauthenticateeA
{ Context  c:MTwoPassAuthenticate
Inv:
c.authenticateeA.Generate ClaimAB.is_generatable AND
c.authenticateeB.Generate ClaimBA.is_generatable AND
c.authenticateeA.Validate ClaimBA.is_validatable
c.authenticateeB.Validate ClaimAB.is_validatable
Pre:
c.authenticateeA.secretA.is_assigned AND
c.authenticateeB.secretB.is_assigned }
Figure 35: UML 2.0 collaboration diagram for mutual two-pass authentication, detailed
view
In this case, five invariants are declared as OCL constraints. The first, third and
fifth invariants are used to check that the instance playing the the authenticateeB
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role is deployed on a part of the system (terminal/node) with the required processing
and computing capacity required to generate the challenge, ChallengeAB, to gener-
ate the claim, ClaimBA, and to validate the response, ClaimAB. Similarly, the second
and fourth invariants are used to check that the instance playing the authenticateeA
role is deployed on a part of the system (terminal/node) with the required processing
and computing capacity required to generate the response ClaimAB and to validate the
response ClaimBA. The reason for declaring these invariants is to ensure that the pro-
tocol and algorithm chosen are not too processor intensive for the parts on which they
are deployed so that the authentication protocol can run whenever the collaboration is
instantiated. The motivation for this is to ensure that service requirements regarding ac-
cessibility [38] are fulfilled when this authentication pattern is composed with service
components/parts. The two pre-conditions c.authenticateeA.secretA.is-
assigned and c.authenticateeB.secretB.is assigned check that se-
cretA and secretB are assigned before the collaboration can execute. It is also pos-
sible to state pre-conditions checking that the instance playing authenticateeA
has knowledge of secretB and that the instance playing authenticateeB has
knowledge of secretA to ensure that all of the a priori conditions are satisfied.
sd ClaimAB
ClaimAB_signal
sd MTwoPassAuthenticate
 ref ClaimAB
ref ClaimBA
alt
Mutually_authenticated
Authct(authenticateA) and 
Authct(authenticateB)
{ goal  =  true }
NotAuthenticated
[ClaimBA  Valid]
authenticateeA : 
claimantA
authenticateeB : 
claimantB
Generate
ClaimAB
Validate 
ClaimAB
Generate 
ClaimBA
Validate 
ClaimBA
authenticateeA : 
claimantA
authenticateeB : 
claimantB
sd ClaimBA
ClaimBA_signal
authenticateeA : 
claimantA
authenticateeB : 
claimantB
alt [ClaimAB  NOTValid]
NotAuthenticated
[ClaimAB  Valid]
[ClaimBA NOT Valid]
Ok_signal
NOk_signal
NOkAB_signal
Figure 36: UML 2.0 interaction diagram for MTwoPass Authenticate
The interaction sequences for the MTwoPass Authenticate pattern are given
in Fig. 36. The challenge and response interaction uses referenced allow re-use of the
same pattern to specify any mutual two pass challenge response protocol.
In the following, we demonstrate specialization of the UML 2.0 interactions dia-
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gram for the mutual two pass authentication pattern, shown in Fig. 36, for the IMS
AKA protocol. The IMS AKA protocol reuses the UMTS AKA mutual two pass au-
thentication protocol [55] for authentication between the user and the IP multimedia
subsystem (IMS). The only difference is in how the parameters are transported for IMS
AKA. The means for transporting the parameters is explained in [31]. Essentially, IMS
AKA extends the security of the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) Digest. Although
HTTP digest is a unilateral two-pass authentication protocol (username and password-
based) with known weaknesses, the IMS AKA extension improves the protocol by
providing mutual authentication and the use of stronger algorithms. Furthermore, the
symmetric key used in the protocol is safely contained on the UMTS integrated circuit
card (UICC) [52].
sd ClaimAB
4xx Auth_Challenge
( IMPI, RAND, AUTN )
sd MTPA IMS AKA
 ref ClaimAB
ref ClaimBA
alt
Mutually_authenticated
Authct(authenticateA) and 
Authct(authenticateB)
{ goal  =  true }
NotAuthenticated
[ RES Valid ]
authenticateeA : 
claimantA
authenticateeB : 
claimantB
Generate
Auth_Challenge
Validate 
AUTN
Generate 
REGISTER
Validate RES
authenticateeA : 
claimantA
authenticateeB : 
claimantB
sd ClaimBA
REGISTER( IMPI,
 Authentication response )
authenticateeA : 
claimantA
authenticateeB : 
claimantB
alt [ AUTN NOTValid ]
NotAuthenticated
[ AUTN Valid ]
[ RES NOTValid ]
Ok_signal
NOk_signal
Nok_AUTN_signal
Authentication response is generated by the 
ISIM using the shared secret K and the 
random challenge RAND
Authentication response = f2K (RAND)
Figure 37: UML 2.0 interaction diagram for MTwoPass Authenticate specialized for
IMS AKA, detailed view
In this specialization of the pattern, as shown in Fig. 37, the instance playing the
authenticateeA role initiates the process and sends a challenge message contain-
ing the IMS private identity (IMPI), a random challenge (RAND), and the authentica-
tion token (AUTN) to the instance playing the authenticateeB role. The AUTN,
which contains a message authentication code (MAC) and the sequence number (SQN),
is used to authenticate the instance playing the authenticateeA role. Then the in-
stance playing the authenticateeB role must first validate the AUTN, and if it is
valid, then an authentication response (RES) is generated by the instance playing the
authenticateeB role and sent to the instance playing the authenticateeA role
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along with the IMPI. The RES is generated using the shared secret key K and RAND
and employs the UMTS security algorithm f2, a message authentication function as
specified in [53] and in [54]. The instance playing the authenticateeA role must
then validate this RES, if it is also valid, then the instances are mutually authenticated.
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[ClaimAB  NOTValid]
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MTwoPassAuthenticate
authenticateeA : 
claimantA
authenticateeB : 
claimantB
{def: goal : Boolean = 
authenticateeA.Authct(authenticateeB) AND 
authenticateeB.Authct(authenticateeA)}
Figure 38: UML 2.0 collaboration and semantic interfaces for the MTwoPass
Authenticate pattern
The semantic connector for the mutual two pass authentication pattern is given
in Fig. 38, defining the visible interface behavior and goals of the collaboration as
explained in Sect. 4.1.2.
{ Context  c:MTwoPassAuthenticate 
Inv: 
c.authenticateeA.Generate ClaimAB.is_generatable AND 
c.authenticateeA.Validate ClaimBA.is_validatable
Pre: 
c.authenticateeA.secretA.is_assigned
 }
{ Context  c:MTwoPassAuthenticate 
Inv: 
c.authenticateeB.Generate ClaimBA.is_generatable AND 
c.authenticateeB.Validate ClaimAB.is_validatable
Pre: 
c.authenticateeB.secretB.is_assigned 
}
Figure 39: Examples of the condition parts of role-binding policies for the
MTwoPassAuthenticate pattern
Fig. 39 provides examples of the condition parts of role-binding policies for the
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generic MTwoPassAuthenticate pattern. The condition part of the role-binding
policy shown for the instance playing the authenticateeA role states that the in-
stance playing the authenticateeA role must possess a secretA, and it must
have the capacity to be able to generate ClaimAB which will be sent to the instance
playing the authenticateeB role, and it must have the capacity to validate the
ClaimBA received from the instance playing the authenticateeB role. If these
conditions are fulfilled, then the instance can play the authenticateeA role. Sim-
ilarly, the condition part of the role-binding policy shown for the instance playing
the authenticateeB role states that the instance must possess a secretB, and
it must be able to to generate a ClaimBA, which is sent to the authenticateeA,
and it must be able to validate the ClaimAB received from the instance playing the
authenticateeA role. If these conditions are fulfilled, then the instance can play
the authenticateeB role. In order for the collaboration to run, both of the role-
binding policies must be fulfilled.
C.3.2 Mutual three pass authentication
In this pattern, the instance playing the authenticateeB role initiates the process
and sends a sends a challenge to the instance playing the authenticateeA role.
Upon receiving this challenge, the instance playing the authenticateeA role gen-
erates a response and sends it back to the instance playing the authenticateeB
role. The response is validated. If the response is valid, then the instance playing
the authenticateeB role generates a claim which is sent to the instance playing
the authenticateeA role. The instance playing the authenticateeA role must
then validate this claim, if it is also valid, then the instances are mutually authenticated.
 
MThreePass Authenticate
claimantA
secretA : string
GenerateClaimAB ()
ValidateClaimBA ()
claimantB
secretB : string         
GenerateChallengeAB () 
ValidateClaimAB ()
GenerateClaimBA ()
authenticateeBauthenticateeA
{ Context  c:MThreePassAuthenticate 
Inv: 
c.authenticateeB.GenerateChallengeAB.is_generatable AND 
c.authenticateeA.Generate ClaimAB.is_generatable AND 
c.authenticateeB.Generate ClaimBA.is_generatable AND 
c.authenticateeA.Validate ClaimBA.is_validatable
c.authenticateeB.Validate ClaimAB.is_validatable
Pre: 
c.authenticateeA.secretA.is_assigned AND 
c.authenticateeB.secretB.is_assigned }
Figure 40: UML 2.0 collaboration diagram for mutual three-pass authentication, de-
tailed view
A detailed view of the collaboration diagram for the mutual three-pass authen-
tication pattern is given in Fig. 40. The properties of the authenticateeA role
and authenticateeB role are defined by claimantA and claimantB. This
view shows the goal for the collaboration, defined as a boolean in OCL. The goal
for the pattern is that the instance playing the authenticateeA role is authen-
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ticated (by the instance playing the authenticateeB role) and that the instance
playing the authenticateeB role is authenticated (by the instance playing the
authenticateeA role).
sd ClaimAB
ClaimAB_signal
sd MThreePassAuthenticate
 ref ClaimAB
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claimantB
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claimantB
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sd ChallengeAB
ChallengeAB_signal
authenticateeA : 
claimantA
authenticateeB : 
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ref ClaimBA
alt
Mutually_authenticated 
Authct(authenticateA) and Authct(authenticateB)
{ goal  =  true }
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alt [ClaimAB  NOTValid]
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[ClaimBA NOT Valid]
NOk_signal
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NOkAB_signal
Figure 41: UML 2.0 interaction diagram for MThreePass Authenticate
The interaction sequences for the mutual three-pass challenge response pattern are
given in Fig. 41. As for the other authentication patterns we have discussed above, the
interactions diagram illustrates how we employ UML 2.0 interaction uses to enable re-
use and flexibility. The ChallengeAB, ClaimAB, and ClaimBA interactions uses
referenced allow use of the same pattern to specify any mutual three-pass authentica-
tion pattern.
The semantic connector for the mutual three-pass authentication pattern is given
in Fig. 42, defining the visible interface behavior and goals of the collaboration as ex-
plained in Sect. 4.1.2. The goal for the collaboration is that the instance playing the
authenticateeA role is authenticated by the instance playing the authenti-
cateeB role, and that the instance playing the authenticateeB role is authentic-
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MThreePassAuthenticate
authenticateeA : 
claimantA
authenticateeB : 
claimantB
{def: goal : Boolean = 
authenticateeA.Authct(authenticateeB) AND 
authenticateeB.Authct(authenticateeA)}
Figure 42: UML 2.0 collaboration and semantic interfaces for MThreePass
Authenticate
ated by the instance playing the authenticateeA role.
{ Context  c:MThreePassAuthenticate 
Inv: 
c.authenticateeA.Generate ClaimAB.is_generatable AND 
c.authenticateeA.Validate ClaimBA.is_validatable
Pre: 
c.authenticateeA.secretA.is_assigned 
 }
{ Context  c:MThreePassAuthenticate 
Inv: 
c.authenticateeB.GenerateChallengeAB.is_generatable AND 
c.authenticateeB.Generate ClaimBA.is_generatable AND 
c.authenticateeB.Validate ClaimAB.is_validatable
Pre: 
c.authenticateeB.secretB.is_assigned 
}
Figure 43: Role-binding policies for the MThreePassAuthenticate pattern
Fig. 43 provides examples of the condition parts of role-binding policies for the
generic MThreePassAuthenticatepattern. The condition part of the role-binding
policy for the instance playing the authenticateeA role states that the instance
must possess a secretA, and it must have the capacity to generate ClaimAB, which
will be sent to the instance playing the authenticateeB role, and it must be able
to validate ClaimBA. If these conditions are satisfied, then the instance can play the
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authenticateeA role. Similarly, the condition part of the role-binding policy for
the instance playing the authenticateeB role states that the instance must pos-
sess a secretB, and it must have the capacity to generate a ChallengeAB, which
will be sent to the instance playing the authenticateeA role, and be able to val-
idate the ClaimAB received from the instance playing the authenticateeA role.
The instance must also be able to generate the ClaimBA, which is sent to the instance
playing the authenticateeA role. If these conditions are fulfilled, then the instance
can play the authenticateeB role.
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D Authorization patterns
This appendix presents the full classification of authorization patterns.
In order to describe any authorization pattern, it is important to recognize that any
authorization pattern requires that authentication has been performed before any au-
thorizations may be granted. Authentication and authorization patterns are combined
to describe how access rights are granted and are thus essential to access control. Ad-
ditionally, an access control model is required for access rights administration. Well
known examples of access control models are e.g., discretionary access control, man-
datory access control, role-based access control, and others [12].
In general, systems are deployed with a wide range of applications and services
each having different authentication and authorization requirements. Authentication
and authorization can be designed and deployed for each service separately, on an
individual basis. Each authentication and authorization solution can be deployed and
maintained separately and independently for each service, however, this leads to the
development of parallel solutions, which would not be cost efficient if a single service
provider offers a range of different services. In the case that several services are being
offered, it is desirable to manage authorizations and to some extent authentication also,
in a centralized manner.
In service composition, we require the possibility to specify authentication require-
ments and authorization requirements depending on the individual services. Central-
ized management of authorizations is important in the environment of dynamic com-
position of services in order to manage access rights efficiently to enable authorization
for use in a wide range of service collaborations. We therefore consider authorization
patterns that allow for handling of authorizations in a centralized manner.
Although there are many authorization management solutions for managing author-
izations these have essentially been classified as two basic authentication and authoriz-
ation architectures [12]:
• User Pull: Authentication is performed by an access server, which also issues
authorizations to the user. The user then presents authorizations directly to the
service.
• Server Pull: The service centralizes information about user entity authorizations
on an access server. The service authenticates the user. When the user attempts
to access the service, the service queries the access server to determine whether
the user is authorized.
The user-pull and server-pull authorization architectures were first identified for
application to web-based solutions in [34], and extended in [12] for application to
any application or service that a user interacts with such as email-servers, Web sites,
services or any system that requires authentication and authorization.
These architectures provide a means for handling authorizations in a centralized
manner. The role of access server is played for e.g. issuing and storing authorizations
associated with the user role. How the authorizations are activated and administered is
described by the access control model to be deployed such as role-based access control
(RBAC).
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The UML 2.0 collaboration structure diagram for the User Pull authentication and au-
thorization architecture is given in Fig. 44. The collaboration diagram shows that the
AccessServer role collaborates with the User role, and the User role collabor-
ates with the Service role. Authentication is performed by the instance playing the
AccessServer role, which also issues authorizations and optionally authentication
information to the instance playing the User role. The instance playing the User role
presents authorizations directly to the instance playing the Service role. In some
specializations of this pattern the service may additionally require that the user authen-
ticates to the service.
User
Access 
Server
Service
 
UserPull
Figure 44: UserPull patterns
In order to facilitate composition of AA-patterns and services, we model the beha-
vior required by the Service role in the UserPull collaboration separately from
the ”pure” service behavior. By doing this, we avoid modifying the ”pure” service
role. We therefore rename the Service role in UserPull authentication and au-
thorization patterns, naming it the ServiceAccessFilter. This participant, the
ServiceAccessFilter, between the Service role and the User, performs the
checking of authorizations to determine if the instance playing the User role is al-
lowed to access the service. In this way, incrementality can be achieved by allowing
services to be defined and developed separately, at different times independently and
then composed with AA-patterns.
We model the User Pull authentication and authorization patterns as a UML 2.0
collaboration that defines three collaborating participants that interact to implement the
user pull authentication and authorization behavior: these are the User, AccessSe-
rver, and ServiceAccessFilter roles. Application of certain AA-patterns to
the User Pull services is represented by three collaboration uses as illustrated in Fig. 45
and explained in the following:
• TwoPartyAuthenticate: This pattern, which we have modelled as a UML
2.0 collaboration in Fig. 22, is shown in Fig. 45 bound to the User and Access-
Server roles. Here, the authenticatee role is bound to the User role, and
the authorisor role is bound to the AccessServer role. For the instanti-
ation of this pattern, it is expected that an appropriate two party authentication
pattern is chosen and applied from the set of authentication patterns described in
Sect. C.
• AuthsActivation: This pattern consists of a request by the instance play-
ing the authsrequestor role for authorizations to be activated and sent to the
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Figure 45: UserPull patterns modified
instance playing the authsrequestor role. The authorizations govern which
services the user is allowed to access. The way in which the authorizations are
activated depends on the access control model that is used. This pattern is in-
voked after the collaboration TwoPartyAuthenticate has reached its goal
of e.g., unilaterally authenticating the authenticatee. In the UserPull
collaboration,AuthsActivation is shown bound to the User and Access-
Server roles.
• CheckingAccessRights: This pattern is invoked whenever the instance
playing the User role requests access to a service. The instance playing the
authoriser role then checks the authorizations to establish whether the in-
stance playing the User role shall be granted access to the service. In the
User Pull collaboration, Checking Access Rights is shown bound to
the User and ServiceAccessFilter roles.
sd UserPull
User Access Server Service AccessFilter
ref
USaf2.CheckingAccessRights
ref
UAs2.AuthsActivation
ref
UAs1.UniTwoPassAuthenticate
Figure 46: Composition of AA-patterns in UserPull, interactions overview
A UML2.0 interactions overview showing the composition of the instances of the
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<<Collaboration>>
UniTwoPassAuthenticate
authenticatee :
responder
authenticator :
challenger
sd UniTwoPassAuthenticate
{def: goal : Boolean =
authenticatee.Unilaterally_Authenticated}
<<Collaboration>>
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:Agtype
sd AuthsActivation
{def: goal : Boolean = auths requestor.Auths_Activated}
<<Collaboration>>
CheckingAccessRights
authorisee :
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authorisor :
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sd CheckingAccessRights
{def: goal : Boolean = authorisee.Auths_checked}
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sd CheckingAccess
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ref USaf2.CheckingAccessRights
Figure 47: Composition of AA-patterns in UserPull
interactions that describe the UserPull patterns behavior is given in Fig. 46. This inter-
actions overview shows the sequencing of the interactions, however, it doesn’t provide
the structural information that is shown in Fig. 47.
Fig. 47 shows the three collaborations involved in the User Pull pattern along with
references to the UML2.0 interactions for modelling the behavior associated with each
of the collaborations. In this figure, collaboration uses are employed to make the inter-
actions of the collaborations available in the UserPull collaboration. The collabor-
ation use of UAs1 of UniTwoPassAuthenticate binds the authenticatee
and authenticator roles to User and AccessServer respectively. Similarly,
the collaboration use UAs2 of Auths Activation binds the authsrequestor
andauthsgranter roles to User and Access Server respectively. The col-
laboration use USaf2 of Checkingaccessrights binds the authorisee and
authorisor roles to the User and ServiceAccessFilter roles respectively.
Goals expressions are defined for each of the collaborations separately, as well as for
the composition of these in UserPull. Dynamic linking of the interactions of the
structural parts can be expressed using composition policies as explained in Section 6.
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Figure 48: ServerPull patterns
The UML 2.0 collaboration structure diagram for the Server Pull authentication
and authorization architecture is given in Fig. 48.
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Figure 49: ServerPull patterns
Fig. 49 shows the ServerPull authentication and authorization services mod-
elled as a UML 2.0 collaboration that defines three collaborating participants that inter-
act to implement the ServerPull authentication and authorization behavior: these
are the User, AccessServer, and ServiceAccessFilter roles. Application
of certain AA-patterns to the ServerPull services is represented by three collabor-
ation uses as illustrated in Fig. 49 and explained in the following:
• TwoPartyAuthenticate: This pattern, which we have modelled as a UML
2.0 collaboration in Fig. 22, is shown in Fig. 49 bound to the User andService-
AccessFilter roles. Here, the authenticatee role is bound to the User
role, and the authorisor role is bound to the ServiceAccessFilter
role. For the instantiation of this pattern, it is expected that an appropriate two
party authentication pattern is chosen and applied as described in Sect. 3.1. and
further explained in Sect. 4.
• ServiceAccessRequest: This pattern consists of a request by the in-
stance playing the service access requestor role for access to the ser-
vice. This pattern is invoked after the collaboration TwoPartyAuthenti-
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cate has reached its goal of e.g., unilaterally authenticating the authenti-
catee. In the ServerPull collaboration, ServiceAccessRequest is
shown bound to the User and ServiceAccessFilter roles.
• CheckingAccessRights: This pattern is invoked whenever the instance
playing the User role requests access to a service. The AccessServer,
which is the instance playing the authoriser role checks the authorizations
to establish whether the instance playing the User role shall be granted access to
the service. In the ServerPull collaboration, CheckingAccessRights
is shown bound to the ServiceAccessFilter roles and AccessServer
roles.
In order to facilitate composition of the authentication and authorization patterns
used in ServerPullwith services, we require that the behavior defined by the Ser-
vice role in the ServerPull collaboration is modelled separately from the ”pure”
service behavior. The separation is desirable in order to achieve incremental service de-
velopment. We therefore rename the Service role of Fig. 48 to ServiceAccess-
Filter role so that we can distinguish this role behavior from the ”pure” service roles
involved in a collaboration of AA-patterns and service roles.
sd ServerPull
User Access Server Service AccessFilter
ref
SAs2.ServiceAccessRequest
ref
SAs1.UniTwoPassAuthenticate
ref
SSaf1.CheckingAccessRights
Figure 50: Composition of AA-patterns in ServerPull, interactions
A UML2.0 interactions overview showing the composition of the instances of the
interactions that describe the UserPull patterns behavior is given in Fig. 50. The inter-
actions overview shows the sequencing of the interactions, however, it doesn’t provide
the structural information that is shown in Fig. 51.
Fig. 51 shows the three collaborations involved in the Server Pull pattern along with
references to the UML2.0 interactions for modelling the behavior associated with each
of the collaborations. In this figure, collaboration uses are employed to make the inter-
actions of the collaborations available in the UserPull collaboration. The collabor-
ation use of SAs1 of UniTwoPassAuthenticate binds the authenticatee
and authenticator roles to User and ServiceAccessFilter respectively.
Similarly, the collaboration use SAs2 of ServiceAccessRequest binds the ser-
viceaccesssrequestor andserviceaccessgranter roles to User and
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Figure 51: Composition of AA-patterns in ServerPull
ServiceAccessFilter respectively. The collaboration use USaf2 of Checking-
AccessRights binds the authorisee andauthorisor roles to the Service-
AccessFilter and AccessServer roles respectively. Goals expressions are
defined for each of the collaborations separately, as well as for the composition of
these in UserPull. Dynamic linking of the interactions of the structural parts can
be expressed using composition policies as explained in Section 5. above in the main
body of this report.
D.3 Access control models
Although not shown in the authentication and authorization patterns presented in Ap-
pendix C and Appendix D, an access control model is needed to administer access
rights (permissions) and enforce access control policies. In this section we briefly de-
scribe the well known access control models, focusing on the role-based access control
model (RBAC) and then we explain the interfaces between a RBAC infrastructure and
the UserPull and ServerPull architectures, respectively. A detailed overview of
different access control models is given in [56].
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Several models for access control have evolved such as discretionary access control
(DAC), mandatory access control (MAC), and others [12]. Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) has emerged as a scalable alternative, and has been the focus area for recent
research on access control resulting in numerous model variants. As explained above
in Sect. 4.2 of this report, we assume that a RBAC model is used with the AA-patterns.
There are five administrative elements in the basic RBAC model: (1) Users, (2)
Roles, and (3) Permissions. Permissions are composed of (4) operations applied to (5)
objects. Fig. 52 shows the basic RBAC conceptual model. In RBAC, users are assigned
to roles based on competencies, authority and responsibilities. Permissions, an abstract
concept that refers to the arbitrary binding of computer operations and resource objects,
are assigned to roles. A permission is a an approval of a particular mode of access to
one or more objects in the system or some privilege to carry out specified actions [1].
An object is any protected resource. In RBAC, users are not directly granted permis-
sions to perform operations on an individual basis. Instead, permissions are assigned to
roles dynamically as an organisation changes and evolves. A user may establish several
sessions simultaneously, and each session may have a different combination of active
roles [12].
Session
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Assigned to Assigned to
1..*
1..*
*
1..*
1
*
1
0..*
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* *
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Applied to* *
Figure 52: Role Based Access Control Model
The notions of subject and objects are used in RBAC relationships. A subject is an
active entity in the system, e.g., a process or task that operates on behalf of the user
within the computer environment. In our work on service composition in a service ori-
ented architecture, we use the notion of a session between collaborating roles (service
session) instead of subject as is common in the RBAC models.
There are two stages to acquiring permissions in a RBAC access control system.
The first stage is authentication of the user (we have modelled this as the two party
authentication pattern). The second stage is activation of roles. Once roles are acquired,
permissions (access authorizations) may be specified for roles based on credentials,
prerequisite roles, and policy. Authorization constraints are an important part of RBAC.
Authorization constraints implement the access control policy for access to a service
and include preconditions that must be satisfied before access to a service may be
granted. The structure and form of the authorizations depends on on which RBAC
model is to be deployed.
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For applying the UserPull patterns, shown in Fig. 45, the instance playing the
AccessServer role must have an interface to the RBAC infrastructure in order
to obtain user authorizations which are distributed to the instance playing the User
role when the Auths activation collaboration executes. The instance playing
the ServiceAccessFilter role interfaces with the RBAC infrastructure to ob-
tain the access control policies that are to be enforced by the instance playing the
authorisor role when the CheckingAccessRights collaboration executes.
For applying the ServerPull patterns, shown in Fig. 49, the instance playing
the AccessServer role must have an interface to the RBAC infrastructure in or-
der to obtain user authorizations status. The instance playing the AccessServer
role also interfaces with the RBAC infrastructure (not shown in our UML 2.0 col-
laborations) to obtain the access control policies that are to be enforced when the
CheckingAccessRights collaboration executes.
